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HTTP Cookies: Standards, Privacy, and Politics
David M. Kristol
Bell Labs, Lucent Technologies
How did we get from a world where cookies were something you ate and where “non-techies” were
unaware of “Netscape cookies” to a world where cookies are a hot-button privacy issue for many
computer users? This paper will describe how HTTP “cookies” work, and how Netscape’s original
specification evolved into an IETF Proposed Standard. I will also offer a personal perspective on
how what began as a straightforward technical specification turned into a political flashpoint when
it tried to address non-technical issues such as privacy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Protocols—Applications; K.2 [History of Computing]: Systems
General Terms: Standardization, Security, Design
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Cookies, state management, HTTP, privacy, World Wide
Web
1. INTRODUCTION
The topic of HTTP “cookies” has become at least slightly familiar to many Internet
users. Articles in the popular press now regularly mention cookies in conjunction
with privacy concerns. However, cookies were in use for over two years before they
first achieved notoriety, and some of that notoriety emerged around the same time
as the appearance of the first formal standard for cookies, which had previously
been informally described on Netscape’s Communications Corporation’s web site.
The cookie standardization process began in April, 1995, with a discussion on
[www-talk]. In December of that year, the IETF undertook to write a cookie stan-
dard. After a series of Internet Drafts got published in connection with extensive
public discussion on [http-wg] (and after noticeable delays due to IETF process),
RFC 2109 [Kristol and Montulli 1997], HTTP State Management Mechanism, was
published in February, 1997 as an IETF Proposed Standard. Technical and political
concerns immediately emerged that led to further discussions and revisions (and
delays) and that finally culminated, in October, 2000, in the publishing of RFC
2965 [Kristol and Montulli 2000].
In this paper I describe what cookies are, how they work, and how applications use
them. I also relate the history of how cookies came to be standardized, and how the
protracted process of standardization interacted with other forces in the explosive
early evolution of the World Wide Web. We participants in the standardization
process unexpectedly found ourselves at the intersection of technology and public
policy when the proposed standard raised concerns about privacy. As co-editor of
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the specification, I’ll reflect on what happened.
2. WHAT ARE COOKIES? WHY ARE THEY USEFUL?
Any discussion of cookies must begin by answering two questions:1 What are they?
Why are they needed? The answers require a modest understanding of how the
World Wide Web (WWW or “Web”) works, which the next section provides.
2.1 An Introduction to Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP [Fielding et al. 1999]) provides the foun-
dation for the Web, and cookies are an addition to HTTP. When a user clicks on a
(hypertext) link in a web browser, the browser (sometimes referred to as “client”
or “user agent”) typically connects to the web server identified by the Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) embedded in the link and sends it a request message, to
which the server sends a response message. Then, after receiving the response, the
browser disconnects from the server. Because the client makes a new connection
for each request, the server treats each request as though it were the first one it
had received from that client. We therefore consider the request to be “stateless:”
each request is treated completely independently of any previous one.2
Statelessness makes it easier to build web browsers and servers, but it makes
some web applications harder to write. For example, it would have been much
harder to create the now-ubiquitous web shopping applications if they could not
keep track of what’s in your shopping basket.
HTTP requests (responses) comprise three parts:
(1) a request (response) line;
(2) request (response) headers, which provide meta-information; and
(3) the request (response) entity itself.
The header meta-information provides both control information for HTTP and
information about the entity being transferred. Information about cookies gets
conveyed in such headers.
Here is an example request. The first line is the request line. The remaining lines
are request headers. There is no entity for a GET request.
GET / HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg,
image/pjpeg, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint,
application/vnd.ms-excel, application/msword, */*
Accept-Language: en-us
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.5; Windows 98;
Win 9x 4.90)
1 Inevitably there’s a third question: Where did the term “cookie” come from, anyway? Magic
cookie, or just cookie, is a computer jargon term with a long and honorable history; it refers to an
opaque identifier that gets passed back and forth between different pieces of software [Raymond
1996].
2 Newer clients and servers are able to maintain a connection for more than one request-response
cycle, but the essential stateless behavior remains.
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Host: aleatory.research.bell-labs.com:80
Connection: Keep-Alive
---blank line---
The corresponding response might look like this.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2001 16:40:54 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.12 (Unix)
Last-Modified: Fri, 05 Jan 2001 23:38:49 GMT
ETag: "121be7-15d-3a565b09"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 1706
Content-Type: text/html
---blank line---
---HTML entity here---
Note that the request and response information is readable text, although the en-
tity transferred need not be. “Web pages” are often encoded in Hypertext Markup
Language (HTML), as in this example (although the actual HTML content has
been omitted).
2.2 How Do Cookies Work?
Web-based applications often use cookies to maintain state in the otherwise stateless
HTTP protocol. As part of its response, a server may send arbitrary information,
the “cookie,” in a Set-Cookie response header. This arbitrary information could
be anything: a user identifier, a database key, whatever the server needs so it can
continue where it left off. Under normal circumstances (and simplifying greatly),
a cooperating client returns the cookie information verbatim in a Cookie header,
one of its request headers, each time it makes a new request to the same server.
The server may choose to include a new cookie with its responses, which would
supersede the old one. Thus there is an implied “contract” between a server and
client: the server relies on the client to save the server’s state and to return it on
the next visit.
To correct a frequent misstatement in early press stories, cookies do not arise
from some insidious invasion of your computer or hard drive by an external intruder.
Rather, your browser stores only those cookies it receives from a server it has visited.
(However, it will be clear later that your browser may visit servers on your behalf
without your knowing it and store cookies from them on your computer.)
A “cookie,” then, is the piece of information that the server and client pass back
and forth. The amount of information is usually small, and its content is at the
discretion of the server. In general simply examining a cookie’s value will not reveal
what the cookie is for or what the value represents.
Restricting the client to return a cookie just to the server from which it was
received is very limiting. Organizations often have multiple servers, and those
servers need to have access to the same state information so that, in the aggregate,
they can provide a service. Therefore, when it sends a cookie to a client, a server
may specify, in a constrained way, the set of other servers to which a client may
also send the cookie in subsequent requests.
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The server can tell the browser to return cookies only in requests to specific parts
of its site, as identified by the URLs. Provided applications use different parts
of the “URL space” (for example, http://shop.com/application1 and http:
//shop.com/application2) servers (or sets of servers) may thus host multiple
cookie-based applications.3
2.3 Proxies
Users can configure their browsers to use an HTTP proxy for a variety of reasons,
such as to improve performance, or because their Internet Service Provider (ISP) or
company requires them to do so. An HTTP proxy is an intermediary that accepts
a request from a client and forwards it to a server, then receives the resulting
response and forwards it back to the client. A typical proxy accepts connections
from multiple clients and can connect to any server. A pure HTTP proxy does not
save the results of the requests and responses it forwards and poses no problems
for applications that use cookies.
A caching proxy, however, may store responses. The purpose of a caching proxy
is to reduce network traffic and response latency: the caching proxy may be able to
return the same response to client 2 that it previously returned to client 1 for the
same request, without the need to forward the second request to the origin server.
However, in some cases returning the same response to both clients is the wrong
thing to do, such as when the response for client 1 contains personalized content,
or when the response is time-dependent. In such a case, the origin server must send
response headers that direct any proxies between the server and the client (there
may be zero or more proxies) not to cache the content, or to revalidate the response
with the origin server before returning the response to the client.
Cookies and caching proxies can interact in undesirable ways, and cookie-based
web applications must take that possibility into account. For example, a shopping
site may allow a page with product information to be cached, but it should not
allow a Set-Cookie response header (and its associated cookie) to be stored with
it. On the other hand, the shopping site should suppress the caching of any pages
that contain personal information, such as shipping information or the contents of
a shopping basket.
2.4 Why Cookies?
Cookies make it easier to build stateful web applications, but they are not essential
to achieve that purpose. To accomplish much the same thing, a server can, for
example, embed state information in URLs, use hidden fields in HTML forms, or
use the client’s Internet Protocol (IP) address. But these approaches are failure-
prone. As Section 4 describes, IP addresses are an unreliable way to identify a
user or computer. If URLs or forms are used, the state information is not part
of the protocol; rather it is contained within the user-accessible information that
the server returns to the user. If a user clicks on a Back button in the browser,
the user’s state would roll back to what it had been for the earlier page. For a
3 Suggestive domain names (such as shop.com) in the examples merely convey the role the names
play in the example. They do not imply that anything described in such examples applies to any
site that might exist with that domain name.
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shopping application, this behavior would have the effect of removing items from
the shopping basket. Moreover, both approaches lend themselves to mischief: a
user can easily capture the text of the URL or form fields, edit it, and resubmit
the information to the server, with unpredictable results. Finally, embedding state
information in URLs is very unfriendly to caches, and web caches are considered
valuable for reducing network traffic and, thereby, congestion.
2.5 How Are Cookies Used?
Cookies have a variety of uses, some of which are controversial. I’ve already de-
scribed how they can make it possible (actually, strictly speaking, they make it
easier) to implement shopping applications.
Cookies can also be used to store “login” information for sites that provide per-
sonalized access, so you don’t have to keep entering your name and password each
time you visit.4
A web site can also use cookies to track which pages you visit on the site. The
site’s administrators may want to use the cookies to better understand how users
navigate the site. With such an understanding, they can organize the site so the
most popular information is in places that are easier for users to find.
Ordinarily a web site (example.com) cannot distinguish a particular user over
time; at best it can tell what IP address your computer has. However, that IP
address often does not identify you uniquely:
—If you use an HTTP proxy, the web site will “see” the proxy’s IP address, not
your computer’s. Thus all of the proxy’s users will appear to be one user to a
server.
—If you use an ISP that provides you with a temporary IP address each time you
connect to it, your IP address could be different when you visit example.com at
different times, and you would appear to the server as different users.
A cookie that’s stored on your host computer is indifferent to the path by which
your computer connects to example.com. The “cookie contract” stipulates that
your computer return its cookie to example.com when you visit it again, regardless
of what your IP address is (or which ISP you use). On a single-user computer like
a PC, the cookie thus identifies the collection of all users of the computer. On a
multi-user computer, the cookie identifies the user(s) of a particular account.
Identifies does not necessarily mean that example.com somehow knows your
name, address, or other personal information. Unless you explicitly provide per-
sonal information, all that example.com can do is assemble a list of URLs on its
site that you (or, rather, the user of a particular computer or account) have vis-
ited, as identified by a cookie. Of course, if you do supply personal information to
example.com, perhaps to register for some service or to order merchandise, that
information can be associated with the URLs you visited. As I’ll discuss later,
this ability to monitor your browsing habits and possibly to associate what you’ve
looked at with who you are is at the heart of the privacy concerns that cookies
raise.
4 [Moore and Freed 2000] deprecates using cookies to store such information under some circum-
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3. THE IETF STANDARDS PROCESS
Because the cookie specification and the HTTP specification have emerged from
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards process, it’s essential to
understand the IETF’s hierarchical organization and how its standards process
works.
The IETF evolved out of the earliest days of the Arpanet to become the de facto
Internet standards body. At the lowest level are “members.” Unlike most other
standards bodies, however, where the body is an internationally sanctioned group
and participants are national representatives, IETF is an open organization whose
members comprise literally anyone who is willing to participate constructively in
IETF activities. There are no membership cards or dues. While they are often
employed by corporations with a keen interest in the ultimate shape that IETF
standards take, members are expected to develop standards on their technical merits
alone, and by custom they are assumed to speak for themselves, and not their
employers.5
Members typically participate in one or more working groups of interest, such as
the HTTP Working Group. A working group (WG) organizes itself, chooses one
or more chairpeople, and draws up a charter, which identifies work items and a
schedule by which they will be completed. Working groups are expected to have a
limited lifetime, on the order of 2-3 years, although the work items in the charter
usually span 12-18 months. Most of the work of a working group gets done on
email mailing lists, which are open to anyone to join, and which must have a public
archive. Occasionally small numbers of working group members meet face-to-face
to work out particularly knotty issues. Otherwise, the only time most members
actually see one another, if ever, is at IETF meetings, held three times a year. One
or more attendees take meeting notes, which then get published on the IETF’s web
site after the meeting. The availability of meeting notes, open mailing lists, and
list archives helps keep the process transparent to anyone interested.
The standards that the IETF produces begin life as an Internet Draft (I-D).
Anyone may submit an I-D to the Internet Drafts Administrator of the IETF.
Typical I-Ds are part of a working group’s business, and some of those are standards
track, as opposed to, say, informational. I-Ds usually have a six-month expiration:
if no action is taken on an I-D, it vanishes. Two typical actions are for the author to
submit a revised I-D to supersede the first, or for the IESG (see below) to approve
an I-D to advance along the standards track.
Attendees at working group sessions at the meeting are expected to have read
the applicable current Internet Drafts. The IETF sets a cut-off date for submitting
I-Ds in advance of each meeting. Therefore, a flood of new I-Ds typically gets
announced by the IETF just before a meeting, as authors try to make their latest
version available. The cut-off ensures an adequate amount of time to review the
I-Ds.
Groups of Working groups comprise Areas. For example, the HTTP Working
Group was part of the Applications Area. Each Area has one or two Area Directors,
who are experienced IETF members. The Area Directors as a group comprise
5 That’s not to say that there aren’t differing opinions about “technical merits,” which may reflect
corporate interests.
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the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). IESG members administer IETF
process, and they monitor the activities of the working groups and, among other
things, watch for similar work in different areas that perhaps should be coordinated.
The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) comprises senior members of the IETF
who guide the overall evolution of Internet standards and adjudicate disputes about
IESG actions.
A typical IETF standard’s life-cycle begins with an initial I-D. The I-D under-
goes vigorous scrutiny and discussion by a working group on its mailing list, which
results in a cycle of revised I-Ds and further discussion. When the working group
reaches “rough consensus,” the chair issues a Last Call for working group com-
ments. Assuming all of those are addressed adequately by the author(s), the chair
recommends that the IESG consider the I-D to be a Proposed Standard. The IESG
then issues its own, IETF-wide, Last Call for comments. If there are comments,
the author(s) will revise the I-D and restart the discussion cycle, although at this
point there usually are but few comments. Once the IESG approves the I-D to be a
Proposed Standard, it gets submitted to the RFC Editor, who edits and formats the
document and assigns it an RFC (Request for Comments) number. Once published
as an RFC, a document never changes. It can only be superseded. Indeed, as a
specification progresses through the IETF process, a newer RFC often supersedes
a previous one.
The IETF emphasizes “rough consensus and running code.” Note that “con-
sensus” does not mean “unanimity.” The process requires that all voices must be
heard, but not all voices must be heeded.
Interested parties are expected to implement a specification once it becomes a
Proposed Standard.6 Before the RFC can progress to the next stage of the process,
Draft Standard, there must be evidence that at least two independently developed
interoperating implementations exist. This requirement ensures, first, that the
specification is clear enough that two or more implementors, working independently,
interpret the specification the same way. Second, the requirement demonstrates
that the pieces so-developed can actually communicate with each other, which, of
course, is essential for any useful networking protocol! Finally, after further review
and implementation experience, a mature specification advances to Full Standard
(or just Standard).
4. RFCS 2109 AND 2965: A BRIEF HISTORY
4.1 In the Beginning. . .
When the World Wide Web first made its way into the public’s consciousness in
1993, the web browser of choice was Mosaic, from The University of Illinois’s Na-
tional Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). Mosaic offered no support
for a state mechanism. Early applications that wanted or needed to support state
had to find an unsatisfactory workaround, possibly among those mentioned earlier.
The first publicly available version of the Netscape Navigator browser (Septem-
ber, 1994) supported state management [Montulli 2001], although that fact was not
well known at the time. The mechanism had been introduced at the request of one
6 Indeed, they often begin to do so before then, and their implementation experience often provides
feedback for the evolution of the specification even before it becomes an RFC.
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of Netscape’s customers to provide the kind of stateful mechanism we now recog-
nize. Lou Montulli at Netscape wrote the original specification, and he chose the
term “cookie.” Cookies solved the problems identified earlier: applications worked
correctly even in the face of a user’s page navigation; and cookies were part of
the protocol, not part of the content, and thus they were less accessible to a user.
Applications that used cookies were more robust than those using alternatives.
It now seems hard to imagine the Internet “landscape” in April, 1995, when
the cookie story begins. Corporate and government web sites had started to pro-
liferate. The technical community actively discussed the possibilities of what we
now call “e-commerce.” ISPs had started to appear and to offer software bundles
that incorporated Mosaic or Navigator. Some early adopters had Internet access
at home.7 More people had Internet access at work, but even email access was rel-
atively uncommon outside the technical community. Amazon.com would not open
for business for three months. No one had used the phrase “dot-com.”
The current cookie standard reflects the interplay of technical issues, personali-
ties, IETF procedures, corporate influences, and external political influences. Table
1 summarizes the important events in the standardization timeline. Although the
process took a long time, note that significant “dead time” occurred following Last
Calls. The Appendix recounts in considerable detail the evolution of the cookie
specification through two RFC cycles. In the sections immediately below I give a
condensed version that highlights the key issues.
September, 1994 Netscape Navigator 0.9 beta, includes cookie support
April, 1995 discussions begin on [www-talk]
August, 1995 State-Info I-D
December, 1995 state management sub-group of HTTP WG forms
February, 1996 state-mgmt-00, first public cookie I-D
June, 1996 working group Last Call on state-mgmt-02
August, 1996 IESG Last Call on state-mgmt-03
February, 1997 RFC 2109, HTTP State Management Mechanism
March, 1998 working group Last Call on state-man-mec-08
June, 1999 IESG Last Call on state-man-mec-10
April, 2000 new IESG Last Call on state-man-mec-12
October, 2000 RFC 2965, HTTP State Management Mechanism
RFC 2964, Use of HTTP State Management
Table 1. Timeline of HTTP State Management Standardization
4.2 RFC 2109: December, 1995 to February, 1997
By late 1995, three proposals for adding state to HTTP were circulating in the
technical community. Because the HTTP Working Group was more concerned
with producing an HTTP/1.1 specification to solve urgent needs, Larry Masinter,
as chair of the group, asked the parties interested in state management to form a
sub-group to recommend a single approach to the rest of the WG. As author of
one such proposal, I agreed to head up the “state sub-group,” and a group of eight
7 America Online (AOL), with two million subscribers, had yet to offer direct Internet access, and
did not until October, 1997. AOL now has over 29 million subscribers.
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people, including Lou Montulli, the author of Netscape’s specification [NS], began
to meet by email and conference call. After considering the alternatives, we soon
decided to adopt Netscape’s underlying mechanism, while preparing a more precise
specification.
[NS] provides rules whereby a cookie can be shared among multiple servers, based
on their domain names. We identified two problems that this cookie sharing mech-
anism could enable8: 1) Cookies can “leak” to servers other than those intended by
the originating server. 2) A server in a domain can cause a denial-of-service attack,
either inadvertently or intentionally, by sending cookies that will disrupt an appli-
cation that runs on another server in the same domain (“cookie spoofing”). We
worded the specification to try to minimize how widely cookies could proliferate,
subject to the (implicit) constraint that the control be based on domain names.
In February, 1996, we identified what we felt was a considerable threat to privacy,
third-party cookies, or “unverifiable transactions.” 9 A transaction, or request, is
“verifiable” when the user can tell beforehand where it will go. A browser can
receive third-party cookies if it loads a page from one web site, loads images (such
as ads) from another web site, and the latter web site sends a cookie with the
image. Our concern was that, whereas a user could well expect a cookie from the
first web site, she has no reason to expect, or even to know, that her browser will
visit another web site (through an unverifiable transaction) and receive a cookie
from it. We added wording to the specification that either outright prohibited a
browser from accepting third-party cookies (“cookies in unverifiable transactions”),
or that permitted a browser to accept them, provided they were controlled by a
user-controlled option whose default value was to reject them.
By late April, 1996, the sub-group had prepared an I-D for review by the entire
WG. After some revisions, there was a WG Last Call in June, some small revisions,
and an IESG Last Call in early August. In October, the IESG expressed concern
that, in essence, suggested the specification was too lenient with respect to iden-
tifying which transactions were “verifiable.” Keith Moore, an Applications Area
Director, and I worked out compromise wording with the IESG to convey the idea
that the inspection mechanism described in the specification was at best minimally
acceptable. In December, with this change, plus another, minor one, the IESG
approved the specification to be published as an RFC, which it was in February,
1997, as RFC 2109, [Kristol and Montulli 1997] “HTTP State Management.”
Some of the threads common to the evolution of the specification had already
manifested themselves:
—We were concerned about how cookies’ domain names affected their ability to
proliferate beyond their intended (or desired) targets.
—We had noted a potential privacy threat in “third-party cookies.”
—The IESG pushed for even stricter language regarding “third-party cookies” than
the WG felt was feasible, given constraints of compatibility and what could rea-
sonably be demanded of an implementation.
—At a particularly volatile time in the evolution of Web technology, IETF process
8See Section A.4.1 for more details.
9More detail can be found in Section A.4.4.
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roughly doubled the time between the specification’s being accepted by the WG
and the time it appeared as an RFC.
4.3 RFC 2965: February, 1997 to October, 2000
RFC 2109 attempted to extend [NS] while using the same HTTP headers. The hope
was that already-deployed clients and servers could be upgraded incrementally to
use the new specification. However, around the time that the IESG approved RFC
2109, but before it got published, a compatibility issue surfaced. We found that
Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer (MSIE) behaved differently in
the face of the attributes we had introduced as part of RFC 2109. Clearly the WG
would have to revise the specification.
4.3.1 Fixing the Incompatibility. Because the two extant major browsers dis-
agreed on how to treat unfamiliar attributes, we were inexorably led to introduce
one or more new headers to resolve the problem. We discussed several different
approaches, all of which entailed putting the “new” attributes in a new header,
where they would not confuse the code that handles existing headers.10
4.3.2 Unverifiable Transactions and Certified Cookies. The publication of RFC
2109 resulted in articles about cookies appearing in the trade and popular press and
to heated protests from the Web advertising networks that emerged while the RFC
was being written and discussed. Because many of the networks had developed
business models that relied on third-party cookies to do targeted advertising, they
felt the RFC’s mandate to disable third-party cookies by default was a threat to
their business. However, the WG generally supported the RFC’s default, noting
that the RFC’s restrictions on third-party cookies would affect the advertisers’
business models that relied on tracking users, not the advertising business itself.
These discussions about third-party cookies led to a proposal of “certified cook-
ies.” A certified cookie would assert how the web server would use the cookie, and
it would be signed cryptographically by an auditing agency. A user could configure
her browser to specify what kinds of uses of cookies she is comfortable with, and
the browser would automatically accept or reject cookies, whether they were from
third parties or not, based on the configuration. The WG’s goal was to layer the
certified cookies mechanism on top of the regular cookie mechanism to enhance the
(default) third-party cookie ban and other cookie controls.
4.3.3 Deadlock and Resolution. Through early 1997, the WG attempted to re-
solve the issues described above (and others; see Section B). By August, however,
discussions had become circular, repeating earlier arguments and mingling technical
and social (privacy) issues. We were making no progress.
As a way out of the impasse, we embarked on a two-part strategy to proceed. I
would remove, temporarily, the parts of the specification concerning “unverifiable
transactions,” letting us focus on the purely technical part. Once we agreed on the
technical part, we would re-introduce the political part and try to reach further
consensus, at which point we should be done.
By February, 1998, we had achieved consensus on the technical part of the speci-
10 More complete discussion is in Section B.1.
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fication. When I subsequently added back the “unverifiable transactions” language,
surprisingly there were no further comments, and Working Group and IESG Last
Calls quickly followed. However the resulting specification, with minor modifica-
tions, languished for two years. Apparently the IESG felt the need to set stronger
guidelines for the use of cookies than the prospective (new) RFC contained.11. Only
when this set of guidelines ([Moore and Freed 2000]) was written and accepted could
the cookie specification be published as RFC 2965.
5. PRIVACY/POLITICS
The cookie specification may have been the first IETF standard at the intersection
of technology and privacy to get widespread public notice, some of which I’ll de-
scribe below. As the Internet moved from research plaything to public plaything
to vital communications infrastructure, the IESG began to expect all RFCs to in-
clude a thoughtful “Security Considerations” section.12 Privacy was considered an
element of security in this context. Indeed, the longest delays incurred during the
standardization process of the two cookie RFCs were due to the tension between the
IESG, which pushed for even stricter privacy safeguards than those two RFCs con-
tained, and the HTTP Working Group, which could achieve even rough consensus
only with slightly weaker safeguards.
5.1 Federal Trade Commission
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) convened a workshop on consumer
privacy in June, 1996. Among the topics discussed was the possible use of the
World Wide Web Consortium’s (W3C) Platform for Internet Content Selection
(PICS) [PICS2000] “to facilitate automatic disclosure of privacy policies and the
availability of consumer choice regarding the use of personal information.”[FTC
1996]
In March, 1997, just weeks after RFC 2109 appeared, the FTC announced another
Consumer Information Privacy Workshop to be held in June [FTC 1997]. Among
the topics discussed were consumer online privacy, industry self-regulation, and
technology that could be used to enhance privacy. In a comment letter to the FTC
regarding the workshop, Peter F. Hartley, Netscape’s Global Public Policy Counsel
wrote:
2.14 Interactive technology has evolved since June 1996 to address
many of the privacy concerns expressed regarding cookies and what in-
formation was placed on a user’s computer and with what notice and
consent. Software manufacturers and open technical standards bodies
have produced innovations that enable users to have more control over
cookies and how web site operators are able to place information on
one’s computer. At this point in time many web site operators and
related third parties are reviewing the technical standards concerning
cookies. These improvements and changes in cookie technology will be
11 The new RFC did not differ materially from RFC 2109 in its privacy provisions. However, the
composition of the IESG had changed in the intervening 3 1/2 years.
12 [Postel 1993], superseded by [Postel and Reynolds 1997], which came after RFC 2109, called
for a “Security Considerations” section, but many RFCs said there were no security issues.
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implemented in upcoming versions of Netscape products. However, as
Netscape is an open standards company we cannot at this time specifi-
cally detail the latest version of this cookie standard until the report of
the most recent IETF meeting is released and reviewed. [Hartley 1997]
Clearly cookies and their privacy implications had become an issue of federal public
policy.13 Since the FTC workshop, cookies have become a frequent topic in the
popular press.
5.2 W3C and P3P
As an outgrowth of the 1996 FTC meeting, members of the W3C began to dis-
cuss a PICS-like mechanism for privacy preferences [Cranor 2001]. In May, 1997,
W3C formed the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P). According to its
information page, P3P
is emerging as an industry standard providing a simple, automated way
for users to gain more control over the use of personal information on
Web sites they visit. At its most basic level, P3P is a standardized set of
multiple-choice questions, covering all the major aspects of a Web site’s
privacy policies. [P3P2001]
P3P defines a mechanism whereby a web site can send its privacy policies in a
well-defined form and using a well-defined vocabulary. The machine-readable form
of the information facilitates automatic processing, making it possible to compare
it to a user’s privacy preferences. P3P would appear to provide the mechanism
needed to support certified cookies.
5.3 Industry Self-Regulation
In response to the FTC’s hearings, the U.S. government and the advertising indus-
try entered a dialog in which the industry created a self-regulating mechanism14
to try to avert threatened government regulation of web sites’ privacy policies and
drew up a set of principles. Separately, TRUSTe formed in 1996 to create a Privacy
Seal that would attest to an organization’s privacy practices. Clearly the issue of
public trust in web sites’s privacy practices has emerged as an important issue,
whether regulated by the government or the industry [Lewin 2000].
5.4 Third-Party Cookies
The advertising networks protested that the cookie standard threatened their busi-
ness. In truth, what the standard really threatened, by disabling third-party cook-
ies by default, was a business model. The Web advertising business comprises two
parts: deciding what ad to return in response to a request and actually sending it.
Unconstrained third-party cookies allow the decision to be targeted more precisely
to a user. But eliminating third-party cookies would not prevent an advertising
network from returning an ad.
13 Indeed, in June, 2000, the Clinton administration banned cookies from federal Web sites unless
their was a “compelling need.” [New York Times 2001] Three bills before the U.S. Congress as of
April, 2001, refer to “cookies.”
14 The industry formed the Network Advertising Initiative http://www.networkadvertising.org.
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Targeted ads are a symptom of something more troubling, profiling, and the
accumulation of profiles has been at the heart of the controversy. On one side are
the advertising networks, who maintain that the assembling of a user’s (anonymous)
profile makes it possible for them to present ads that are more likely to interest the
user.15 On the other side are privacy advocates (and users), who question whether
advertising networks are entitled to assemble such profiles, and who say that at the
very least the advertisers must get users’ permission before they do so.16
The initial reaction from the advertisers to the default setting for third-party
cookies was clearly negative. They didn’t see the need to ask for permission before
setting cookies, and they felt that asking for it would be too burdensome anyway.
As the weight of public unease and the threat of governmental regulation grew,
they showed support for techniques like certified cookies, which matches a user’s
comfort level with an advertiser’s declared use, to bypass the crude all-or-nothing
enabling of third-party cookies in browsers.
It should be noted that disabling third-party cookies does not eliminate the pro-
filing of users, only profiling done by third parties, and even then web bugs [Smith
2001] can be used for much the same purpose. Web sites that serve their own ads
can still create profiles of visitors to their sites, using cookies within their own do-
main. However, the profiles are less comprehensive, because they derive from just
the one site or a set of related sites, and users are less likely to be surprised by such
profiling, because they consciously visited the site.
The advertisers frequently insisted that they only compiled anonymous profiles
to be used for targeting their ads, and that they had no plans to match the profiles
with personally identifiable information. However,
[T]he merger of database marketer Abacus Direct with online ad com-
pany DoubleClick hit front pages and sparked a federal investigation in
January 2000 when it was revealed that the company had compiled pro-
files of 100,000 online users — without their knowledge — and intended
to sell them [PF 2000].
This behavior confirmed users’ worst fears and justified our concern about third-
party cookies in the standards process.
5.5 Do Users Care?
Do users care whether a web site tracks them? The question has no easy answer.
One study [WebSideStory 2001] showed that users rejected fewer than 1% of cookies
in over a billion page views.17 This simple number may have many explanations,
among them that users:
—don’t know about cookies.
—know about cookies but don’t know how cookies might be used to track them.
15 Of course, they can also charge more money for them, or they can hope for more revenue
through a higher “click-through rate,” or they can hope to sell the profiles, perhaps after linking
them with personally identifying information.
16 Although they express concern about profiling, users do seem to accept the concept of adver-
tising as a means to support web sites.
17 Privacy policies routinely go unread, too.
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—know how cookies can track them, but are unconcerned.
—have inadequate means to select which cookies they will accept, so they just give
up and accept all of them.
—assume that the entities collecting the information will protect it and use it
discretely.
—assume governmental regulations will prevent web sites from misusing informa-
tion about them that they might collect.
Most Web browsers enable cookies by default, and most users won’t even know
they’re in use. Yet I think most users would object to the idea that a web site
uses cookies to watch what they do and where they go on the site. I think most
users would be even more uneasy that some unseen entity uses cookies to watch all
of their Web surfing activities [Kaplan 2001]. However, cookies are used by most
shopping sites, a popular activity on the Web, so it’s impractical for users to disable
cookies altogether. Moreover, the heavy use of cookies on some sites renders them
virtually unusable if a user enables cookie warnings. Lacking easy to use selective
control of cookies, or much motivation18, the average user is most likely just to leave
the default settings alone. Indeed, that’s why advertisers who rely on third-party
cookies objected to their being disabled by default.
6. LESSONS LEARNED
The best of all teachers, experience. Pliny the Younger
I’ve learned some things the hard way that may help guide other standards
writers.
6.1 Writing Standards Is Hard
A technical specification is a contract between consenting applications. It is amaz-
ingly hard to write a standard that says neither more nor less than you intend,
that leaves room for implementation flexibility without resulting in incompatibil-
ity, and that is precise enough to avoid ambiguous (mis-)readings. The process of
developing standards and letting all voices be heard is also messy, like most demo-
cratic processes. It gives me a new appreciation for how hard it must be to write
legislation, even ignoring the distorting influences of lobbyists.
6.2 Zombie Topics
During the standardization process, some topics never died. Throughout the pro-
cess, issues that we thought we had resolved got raised again, and consensus had to
be achieved again. No doubt this revivification arose as new participants entered
the discussions belatedly, and the fact that the discussions took time to resolve
highlights how rough, in fact, the consensus was. Perhaps a Frequently Asked
Questions document that summarizes resolved issues could short-circuit unproduc-
tive rehashes.
18 People willingly divulge information about themselves every day through credit card purchases,
supermarket discount cards, and electronic toll collection systems.
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6.3 Reconciling Incompatible Goals
6.3.1 Domain-matching Rules. We began work on the cookie specification in-
tending to be as compatible as possible with [NS] while being more precise and while
trying to control inadvertent or malicious cookie sharing. The domain matching
rules reflected this intent, but the intent was ultimately impossible to achieve. As
described in Section A.4.1, the domain matching rules implicitly assume properties
of the domain name system that do not actually exist, and it is therefore impossible
to allow cookies to be shared as widely as desired but not too widely. Perhaps the
certified cookie specification will solve this problem better.
6.3.2 Compatibility and Deployment. HTTP is readily extensible if new features
derive from adding headers, as long as clients and servers that ignore19 the headers
will function correctly. Some thought must also be given to what an older proxy
would do with the header.
Changing the behavior of existing headers to extend an existing feature is harder,
as we discovered. When the state sub-group began work, only Netscape Navigator
supported cookies, and we could base our decisions on how Navigator did things
to arrive at a compatible solution. By the time RFC 2109 was complete, Microsoft
Internet Explorer was widely deployed, and, as luck would have it, Navigator and
MSIE were incompatible in an important way.
A solution that uses new headers to solve the incompatibility problem poses
deployment problems, which is why the state sub-group had avoided introducing
new cookie headers in the first place. Ultimately the new-header solution should
supersede the old, but meanwhile there is a transition period during which both
headers must be used. The duplicate headers impose extra costs on servers that
send them, yet the servers experience little benefit from sending them. Web site
operators that conscientiously choose to support the new specification could well
find that few client programs support it, and thus they would incur the added cost
for a long transition period. With little incentive for servers to support the new
specification, there would be correspondingly little incentive for browser vendors to
add support for it.
6.4 Speak Now, or Forever Hold Your Peace
A pattern emerged in the cookie specification process: After considerable discussion,
I would produce a presumed final I-D. At Last Call, a sudden flurry of substantive
comments would appear that should have been made earlier. Apparently the Last
Call provided the stimulus that was necessary to rouse people to take a serious look
at the specification.
Sometimes it’s hard to identify all the constituencies that need to participate.
The advertising networks felt they had been blind-sided by IETF process, and that
the resulting standard was a threat to their business. The problem was that the
advertising networks were unaware the IETF was producing a cookie standard that
might affect their business, even though the process was open. Perhaps we were
remiss not to inform them. However, we were largely unaware of their activities,
at least initially. In any case, the (“rough consensus” of the) working group and
19 Which is what they are supposed to do if they see an unfamiliar header.
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the IESG steadfastly supported the “third-party cookie” default that was their
principle objection.
6.5 How Wide is the World Wide Web?
We chose the default setting for third-party cookies because we felt it served the
privacy expectations of users, especially European users, who, we inferred from
European Union recommendations, might have high expectations. In 1999, a Eu-
ropean Union Working Party Recommendation stated its concern
about all kinds of processing operations which are presently being per-
formed by software and hardware on the Internet without the knowledge
of the person concerned and hence are “invisible” to him/her
and went on to mention specifically “the cookies mechanism as currently imple-
mented in the common browsers.” [WP17 1999]
Surely, we reasoned, vendors would choose to take such concerns into account for
all users. Evidently we reasoned wrong. Vendors have steadfastly supported the
advertising industry, leaving third-party cookies enabled by default.
6.6 Technical Decisions May Have Social Consequences
When I began working on the cookie specification, I thought I was trying to write
a technical specification, and, frankly, I hoped my State-Info proposal would pre-
vail. However, lurking within both that proposal and [NS] were social policy issues
I had not anticipated. The simpler State-Info proposal specifically mentioned pri-
vacy; [NS] implicitly considered privacy through its domain-matching rules. The
final specification clearly addressed social issues.
Of course it’s not uncommon for technology to create or enable social conse-
quences, and technologists are often ill-equipped, and perhaps are even inappro-
priate parties, to deal with the fallout. Consider just one recent example. Cell
phone use has led to the desire to provide emergency (“911”) service, just as is
provided for wired phones. To provide such service, cell phone providers need to
know reasonably accurately the location of the cell phone user. However, users of
such phones may thereby lose the anonymity of movement they would have had
without such phones. Moreover, businesses stand ready to try to sell the cell phone
users their products when they are nearby. The technology began with a worthy
intent, but other, less noble, uses may evolve.
The task of reconciling social and technical choices can be hard even when the
social component is acknowledged from the beginning [Cranor and Reigle 1998].
Looking back, it’s clear that the social ramifications of the cookie specification
took on more importance, and were harder to resolve, than the purely technical
ones. Or, looking at it another way, we discovered that our apparently technical
decisions had social consequences.
Cookies are inherently neither good nor bad. They can enhance web applications,
and they can be used to invade privacy; technology alone cannot distinguish good
uses from bad. In fact, just labeling a use as “bad” is highly subjective. Even
members of the state management sub-group had mixed opinions.
Who gets to decide these issues? Sometimes technologists do, just by the capa-
bilities they build into, or leave out of, their work. Sometimes technologists throw
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up their hands and say, “Not my problem.” But society increasingly holds busi-
nesses accountable for the secondary effects of their products, and technologists
can’t simply ignore the effects of what they build. Ultimately I think few of the
conflicts at the intersection of technology and society can be resolved by wholly
technological means. Because the resolution must balance the needs and desires of
various constituencies, the conflict must in the end be resolved through the political
process.
6.7 How to Do it Better
In this section I reflect on how things might have been done differently.
6.7.1 Involve the stakeholders. Successful standards involve the stakeholders. Al-
though the IETF nominally comprises individuals, the reality is that those individ-
uals work for companies, and those companies have a stake in the standardization
process. Thus it was prudent for us to involve Netscape, particularly, where cookies
originated, and Microsoft. Indeed, when we began our work, Netscape’s represen-
tative did participate. But Microsoft was not yet a factor in Web software and did
not participate early on.
Evidently the specification veered in a direction Netscape could not support,
although we frequently sought feedback about Netscape’s plans and buy-in for
the evolving specification. A representative from Microsoft belatedly joined the
discussions around the time RFC 2109 appeared, but he was often unhappy with
the details of both RFC 2109 and its successor, particularly the domain-matching
rules and third-party cookie default.
Web site operators are another major stakeholder. They are unlikely to adopt
changes that cost them time and money unless they gain something in return. Al-
though many sites probably rely on the software they buy from vendors to “do
the right thing,” they should be increasingly concerned by possible federal legisla-
tion concerning privacy. Although none of the privacy legislation has yet become
law, there is clearly growing sentiment to “do something,” because the voluntary
compliance with self-regulation has been dismal. Web sites should probably expect
that they will be required to notify users how they plan to use personal informa-
tion, and they may be required to let users “opt-in” rather than “opt-out.”[S.2606
2000] The CommentURL feature of RFC 2965 20, coupled with well-designed user
interfaces in common browsers, would probably satisfy the requirements of opt-in
information collection. However, the browser vendors have shown little enthusiasm
for the feature.
6.7.2 Separate policy and mechanism. It’s common to argue that mechanism
should be separated from policy, and that the policy rules should be specified
in a separate document from the one that specifies the mechanism. Indeed, I
have described how we were unable to solve, through technology alone, the privacy
problems that cookies might cause.
The specification we developed included many intrusions of policy into the mech-
anism. For example, the domain matching rules dictate which cookies to accept and
which to reject. However, the political reality was that the IESG would probably
20See Section B.2.3.
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not have accepted a specification that side-stepped the implications of a mechanism
unburdened by privacy considerations.
6.7.3 Avoid lily-gilding. We fell prey to the temptation to add features that
seemed worthwhile without actually getting agreement that they would actually
be used. (On the other hand, IETF process would require that unimplemented
features be removed from the specification before proceeding to Draft Standard
or beyond.) Sometimes the discussions of these extra features, however worthy,
distracted from the larger goal of making a usable specification available quickly.
7. CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Timing Matters
Delay is the deadliest form of denial. C. Northcote Parkinson
Not to decide is to decide. Anonymous
When the state management sub-group began its work in December, 1995, Net-
scape’s Navigator browser dominated the market, Microsoft’s Internet Explorer
barely existed, e-commerce was nascent, and advertising networks scarcely ex-
isted.21 We attempted to standardize something that closely resembled Netscape’s
under-specified cookies, but we felt the need to mitigate the privacy threats that
we perceived could be mounted by cookie applications. And we felt a sense of ur-
gency to produce a specification quickly, to keep pace with the evolving HTTP/1.1
specification and, by producing a tight specification, to provide a level playing field
for all browser vendors.
Unfortunately, events did not unfold as we might have hoped. Although what
ultimately became RFC 2109 was essentially complete seven months after we began,
for a variety of reasons the RFC itself did not appear for yet another seven months.
During those fourteen months, MSIE emerged as a serious competitor to Navigator,
e-commerce began to blossom, and advertising networks had become common in
the Web ecosystem.
Each of these factors made the world different from when we began our work.
MSIE became much more than a marginal browser, and we could not ignore the
incompatibilities that we had discovered. E-commerce applications were becoming
sophisticated, and their software investment reduced the likelihood that they would
be willing to switch to IETF cookies.22 And the advertising networks that had
business models that depended on creating profiles by using third-party cookies felt
that the language in RFC 2109 was a dagger aimed at the heart of their business.23
Of all of these issues, the one that indirectly got the most attention was the
third-party cookie default. The attention was indirect in that, shortly after RFC
2109 was published, a flurry of media articles appeared about cookies and whether
they were a threat to privacy. I was occasionally asked at the time whether I in fact
21 DoubleClick incorporated in January, 1996 and first came up in our discussions in June.
22 On the other hand, to the extent that support for IETF cookies, those following RFC 2109 or
2965, found its way into shrink-wrapped e-commerce applications, deployment could conceivably
occur quickly.
23 Although RFC 2109 said third-party cookies were generally forbidden. a browser could have
an option to enable them, provided the default setting for such an option was “off.”
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knew of any privacy violations that had actually taken place, and I had to answer,
“No,” that they were, as far as I knew, hypothetical. Then again, I didn’t expect
someone doing those things to admit it. Events since then, such as the proposed
merger of DoubleClick and Abacus Direct databases, have shown that the threats
were anything but hypothetical.
The browser vendors showed, through their actions, that they were unwilling
to change the third-party default to “off.” In my opinion, that choice was hardly
surprising. At a time when Microsoft and Netscape were giving away browsers to
try to achieve market dominance, while at the same time they were selling servers,
both vendors were most likely to heed their paying customers, not the people who
got programs for free. And the people with the money wanted advertising, they
wanted to use advertising networks, and most advertising networks wanted to be
able to do targeted advertising. Targeted advertising was easiest to do using third-
party cookies, and the server/browser vendors were unlikely to anger their paying
customers by disabling third-party cookies.
The 3 1/2 year delay between RFC 2109 and RFC 2965 would appear to have
rendered the latter RFC moot. While I was personally committed to seeing the
specification through to its conclusion, I think the Web has evolved too much for
web sites to revise their applications to use it and for vendors to change the clients
and servers to use it. Moreover, the end of the “browser wars” means there’s
much slower turnover of browsers, and it would take a very long time for RFC
2965-compliant browsers to penetrate the user community in a meaningful way.
7.2 On the Bright Side. . .
Having painted such a bleak picture, I must however point out some bright spots.
Netscape introduced modest cookie controls in their browsers, apparently in re-
sponse to the discussions leading to RFC 2109, including the ability to disable
third-party cookies, although the default remained to allow them. Many products,
both commercial and free- or shareware, now make it possible to control which
cookies to accept and which to ignore. Even Microsoft released patches to Internet
Explorer to provide more extensive cookie control facilities, but then they backed
off [PF 2000].
The issuance of RFC 2109 helped ignite a public discussion of cookies, their uses
and abuses. That discussion has helped raise the general public’s awareness of
privacy issues in general and has made privacy a governmental policy issue. Web
sites feel public and governmental pressure to explain their privacy policy. When
they violate that policy (toysmart.com [Wired 2000]), reduce its protections (Ama-
zon.com [PF 2000]), or plan to join anonymous and personal data (DoubleClick
and Abacus), they suffer in the public press.24
Discussion of other issues continues as well. For example, should web sites collect
personal information and then give users the opportunity not to have the informa-
tion retained (“opt-out”) or must users be asked ahead of time (“opt-in”) before the
sites collect the information? Is it fair for a web site to post a privacy policy that
they “can change from time to time” without notifying users, and which therefore
24 [Garfinkel 2000, p.9] contains several even earlier examples of public outrage at privacy intru-
sions.
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requires a user to check that policy on a regular basis?
7.3 Summary
RFC 2965, HTTP State Management Mechanism, took 5 1/2 years to become a
Proposed Standard, and yet the major vendors largely ignore it. Therefore its
development would, at first glance, seem to have been a colossal waste of time.
This paper has explained why it took so long and presents a case study of how
the collaborative IETF process works. The fact that the standard may be largely
ignored has more to do with other factors than with its technical merit. Moreover,
the surrounding discussions of privacy considerations may, in the long run, prove
to have been more important for society and the technical community than the
technical issues.
7.4 Why Did I Stick With It?
Why should I continue to work on the cookie specification for over five years in
the face of all the delays and fulminations, particularly when my company had no
stake in the outcome, and even more particularly as the reality sank in that the
specification might well never be deployed widely? The answer is complicated, and
more than likely even I don’t fully comprehend why.
For a start, I didn’t expect the process to take so long. I had hoped that I could
wrap up my involvement when RFC 2109 appeared. Then the incompatibility came
to light, and I felt the need to address it. Probably equally significant, however, was
the outspoken criticism of a small number of people who seemed bent on delaying
or sabotaging the specification and the process, one of whom more or less said to
me, “[My employer, a major vendor,] will never support this standard, so why are
you bothering to keep working on it?” Feeling I was being bullied made me more
determined to persist, and I didn’t like to see an attempt to bully the IETF, either.
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APPENDIX
A. HISTORY OF RFC 2109, HTTP STATE MANAGEMENT MECHANISM
The following sections comprise a roughly chronological recitation of how the cur-
rent cookie specification evolved. I take this approach for several reasons:
—It presents a detailed case history of how one standard evolved.
—It makes it easier to explain why various sections of the standard say what they
say.
A.1 The State Sub-Group Forms
Events were moving quickly in the Web technical community in 1995 as people
embraced this new, exciting medium. The IETF HTTP Working Group (WG) had
formed in October, 1994, with a goal, among other things, to produce an Internet
Draft (and RFC) that would describe HTTP/1.0 as it then existed. (Developers
had been using an older document by Tim Berners-Lee as the standard reference.)
By the December, 1995, IETF meeting, the Web was recognized as a “success
disaster”: its explosive growth was stressing the Internet in two important dimen-
sions:
(1) Web network traffic was growing fast, and HTTP’s one-request-per-connection
behavior was very network-inefficient.
(2) As big consumer brands started to register domain names and create web sites
for those brands, they used one IP address for each such name at a time when
there was widespread fear in the IETF community that the 32-bit IP version 4
address space would soon be exhausted.
The IAB urged the HTTP working group to produce a new standard quickly that
would address these problems.
Meanwhile, the topic of keeping state to track users had been discussed on mailing
lists. Back in April, Brian Behlendorf had initiated a thread labeled “Session
tracking” on the www-talk mailing list [www-talk], where new ideas for the Web
usually got discussed. Behlendorf wanted a mechanism that would let a server
operator track how a user navigated through a server’s pages, but that would leave
control of the identifier with the user. He proposed that clients send a client-
assigned and client-controlled Session-ID with each request. This identifier would
be constant for the lifetime of a browser invocation and could be used by a server
to identify multiple requests from the same client. Thus a server could maintain
state if it used this identifier as an index into a database that tracked a session.25
It could also be used by the server to track a user’s traversal through a web site.
Being somewhat aware of Netscape’s cookies, I proposed a lighter-weight, server-
controlled mechanism that was meant to achieve the same end. A server could
return a single arbitrary datum in a response, and a client would be obliged to return
that datum with each request to the same server (but not to other servers). The
user could control the degree to which the client participated in stateful sessions.
25 Think of a session as the interval between when a server first starts keeping track of a browser
and when it stops. In the context of cookies, a session begins when a browser first gets a cookie
and ends when the browser discards the cookie (or it expires).
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As part of the same thread, Lou Montulli proposed what was essentially Netscape’s
cookie mechanism.
In August, 1995, I submitted an Internet Draft that described my Session-ID
(later renamed State-Info) proposal [Kristol 1995]. In response to comments from
participants on the HTTP WG mailing list [http-wg], I revised the proposal and
submitted a second I-D in September. I added sections on privacy to these early
proposals, largely in response to comments from Koen Holtman who, being Dutch,
gave us a European perspective on privacy issues.26
At the December meeting, with these three related state management proposals
(Behlendorf, Kristol, Montulli) percolating through the HTTP community, Larry
Masinter, new co-chair of the HTTP Working Group, asked the interested parties
to form a sub-group to devise a single mechanism and propose it to the Working
Group. His goal was to separate the issue of state management from the HTTP
specification as a whole, make separate progress on it, then merge it back into the
complete HTTP specification, thus letting the rest of the working group focus on
more urgent issues.
I agreed to lead the state management sub-group, which began with three people
and grew to eight, including Lou Montulli. In a triumph of hope over experience,
the sub-group agreed to complete its work by January, 1996, and to publish its work
for the greater Working Group in February, so that the work could be incorporated
into a new HTTP specification by March, 1996.
In a lively dialog that ensued on [http-wg] immediately following the IETF meet-
ing (“making progress on State-Info”), there seemed to be some consensus to adopt
the State-Info proposal as the basis for HTTP state management, though there
was disagreement about whether it was better than Netscape’s. (There was also
some squabbling about whether IETF process was being duly followed to determine
whether consensus had been achieved.)
The sub-group began its work within days after the IETF meeting, using telecon-
ferences and a private email list to work out issues. Although standardizing a new,
simpler mechanism was initially more appealing, we quickly realized that any new
mechanism would have to provide compatibility with Netscape’s already-deployed
cookie mechanism. Adoption of a new, different mechanism would depend on how
quickly such a mechanism could be deployed, both in servers and in clients, whereas
Netscape’s mechanism already enjoyed significant market penetration. We there-
fore quickly recognized that it made sense to start from Netscape’s specification.
Having thus shifted our focus, our task became one of tightening up Montulli’s
somewhat fuzzy specification.
A.2 Technical Details: Netscape’s Cookies
So the issues that came under discussion will be clearer, the following sections
describe in more technical detail how cookies work, according to Netscape’s speci-
fication [NS].
A.2.1 Server to Client: Set-Cookie. Recall that the earlier, simplified descrip-
tion of cookies explained that the server sent a Set-Cookie response header with a
26 Holtman explained to us that European users expect significant privacy protection.
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cookie value, and the client was expected to return that value in a Cookie header
when it next made a request to the same server. In fact, the Set-Cookie header
may also include attribute-value pairs that further control cookie behavior. The
(incomplete, informal) syntax for Netscape’s Set-Cookie looks like this:
set-cookie = "Set-Cookie:" set-cookie
set-cookie = NAME "=" VALUE *(";" set-cookie-av)
NAME = attr
VALUE = value
set-cookie-av = "domain" "=" Domain_Name
| "path" "=" Path
| "expires" "=" Date
| "secure"
NAME=VALUE
NAME is the cookie’s name, and VALUE is its value. Thus the header Set-Cookie:
id=waldo sets a cookie with name id and value waldo. Both the cookie NAME
and its VALUE may be any sequence of characters except semi-colon, comma,
or whitespace.
domain=Domain_Name
The value for the domain attribute selects the set of servers to which the client
may send the cookie. By default (if domain is omitted), the cookie may be
returned only to the server from which it came. If domain is specified, the
client may send the cookie to any host that tail-matches domain, subject to the
following restriction [NS]:
Only hosts within the specified domain can set a cookie for a do-
main and domains must have at least two (2) or three (3) periods in
them to prevent domains of the form: “.com,” “.edu,” and “va.us”.
Any domain that [falls] within one of the seven special top level
domains listed below only require two periods. Any other domain
requires at least three. The seven special top level domains are:
“COM,” “EDU,” “NET,” “ORG,” “GOV,” “MIL,” and “INT.”
The algorithm for matching domains will be discussed frequently and in more
detail later.
path=Path
The value for the path attribute is a URL that specifies the subset of URLs
on the server for which the cookie may be returned. If path is specified, the
cookie may be returned to any URL for which path is a string prefix of the
request URL. If path is not specified, “it as assumed to be the same path as
the document being described by the header which contains the cookie.”
expires=Date
The value for the expires attribute is a timestamp in one of several standard
formats, but in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC, GMT). If expires is speci-
fied, it gives a time after which the cookie should be discarded. If not specified,
the cookie is supposed to be discarded “when the user’s session ends.”
secure
If this attribute (which takes no value) is present, it means the cookie should
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“only be transmitted if the communications channel with the host is a secure
one. Currently this means that secure cookies will only be sent to HTTPS
(HTTP over SSL) servers.” Otherwise the cookie “is considered safe to be sent
in the clear over unsecured channels.”
If a client receives a Set-Cookie header for cookie NAME, and the client already
has a cookie with the same name, domain, and path, the new information replaces
the old.
A.2.2 Client to Server: Cookie. A client is expected to maintain a collection of
the cookies it has received over time. Before it sends a request to a server, the
client examines all its cookies and returns zero or more cookies to the server if:
—the server’s hostname matches the cookie’s domain attribute, according to the
rules above; and
—the URL matches the cookie’s path attribute, according to the rules above; and
—the cookie has not reached its expiration time.
The client sends matching cookies in a Cookie request header:
cookie-header = "Cookie:" cookie *(";" cookie)
cookie = NAME=VALUE
That is, the cookie name and value are returned. If more than one cookie matches,
they are separated by semi-colon.
[A]ll cookies with a more specific path mapping should be sent be-
fore cookies with less specific path mappings. For example, a cookie
“name1=foo” with a path mapping of “/” should be sent after a cookie
“name1=foo2” with a path mapping of ”/bar” if they are both to be
sent.
A.2.3 Commentary. The Netscape cookie specification seemed to suffer from a
number of syntactic and semantic deficiencies that the sub-group wanted to fix.
Syntactic
(1) [NS] gives no precise syntactic description of the Set-Cookie and Cookie head-
ers.
(2) By convention, duplicate HTTP headers can be “folded” into a single header,
with the duplicate values separated by comma. So, for example, if a request
has the headers
Cookie: cookie1=value1
Cookie: cookie2=value2
this should be equivalent to
Cookie: cookie1=value1, cookie2=value2
However [NS] specifies semi-colon to separate multiple cookies in cookie-header,
not comma. If multiple Cookie headers got folded together, the server might
be confused by the comma that separated cookie values.
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(3) If comma were to be allowed to separate cookies according to the HTTP con-
vention, then a “quoting” mechanism would be necessary for attribute values,
especially expires, for which two of the acceptable formats contain embed-
ded commas, and for cookie values (although they were specified to exclude
comma).
(4) [NS] is vague about what characters are acceptable in the values of domain and
path attributes.
(5) [NS] does not specify whether Set-Cookie attributes are case-sensitive or not.
Semantic
(1) The entire specification seems to lack sufficient precision to serve as a standard.
For example, what exactly is the domain matching algorithm? What exactly
is the default value for the path attribute?
(2) There is insufficient discussion of how cookies interact with caches.
A.3 State-Info
Although the sub-group chose not to endorse the State-Info proposal, many of the
ideas that were present in it found their way into the IETF specification for cookies.
Therefore this section describes some of the important aspects it contained.
The basic State-Info mechanism resembles cookies as I have so far described them.
A server can send the response header State-Info: opaque-information, with the
expectation (or, at least, hope) that the client will return the same information in
a State-Info request header on the next request to the server. (The proposal used
the same State-Info header for both requests and responses.) State-Info may
only be returned to the server from which it came.
Unlike [NS], the State-Info proposal specifically outlines facilities that a browser
might provide to a user to inspect and control the state information that it receives.
It also recommends that state information be discarded, possibly under user control,
when a browser exits. Finally, the State-Info proposal stated that the State-Info
request/response header be passed through proxies transparently, and that the
header should never be cached, although the associated content could be.
A.4 Sub-Group Discussions and the First Internet Drafts
The very earliest mailing list discussions regarding state management raised issues
that recurred throughout the standardization process:
—to which domain names a cookie could be forwarded
—privacy
—how cookies interact with proxies
A.4.1 The Domain Attribute. The domain attribute of Netscape’s proposal
quickly became a focus of the sub-group’s attention. [NS] provides a primitive
kind of domain validation on cookies. The value of the domain attribute must
tail-match the domain of the request-URI, subject to a 2-dot/3-dot rule. As de-
scribed earlier, the rules require that, for domain names from international domains
(where the top-level domain is two characters long, e.g., .uk), the domain name
must comprise at least three components, with a leading ‘.’: .ucl.ac.uk. Where
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the top-level domain is three characters long (e.g., .com), the domain name must
comprise at least two dot-separated components: shop.com. Thus, a request to
www.shop.com may set the domain attribute to www.shop.com or shop.com, but
not .com.
Clearly this mechanism is imperfect as a way of controlling whether cookies might
be sent to unintended destinations. It relies on the idea that domain names are
administered hierarchically. It depends on the number of characters in the top-level
domain! On the other hand, it does not require sophisticated mechanisms such as,
say, requiring a server to send a cryptographically signed list of valid servers to
which cookies may be returned.
The domain attribute actually gives rise to two kinds of problems, both related
to too-wide sharing of cookies: 1) Cookies may “leak” to servers other than those
intended by the originating server. 2) A server in a domain can cause a denial-of-
service attack, either inadvertently or intentionally (“cookie spoofing”), by sending
cookies that will disrupt an application that runs on another server in the same
domain.
Cookie Leakage. Suppose a business, biz.com, runs a shop on shop.biz.com.
Suppose that shop.biz.com sets domain=biz.com when it sends the cookie
Customer=custid to a shopper’s browser. shop.biz.com sets domain that way
because it wants to share the cookie with pay.biz.com, the server that handles
payment for shoppers. So far so good. Now suppose that info.biz.com is a server
that provides information about biz.com. If a shopper first visits shop.biz.com
and then visits info.biz.com, the latter site would get the cookie originally set
by shop.biz.com. That behavior may be undesirable, either to the administrators
of shop.biz.com or info.biz.com, or to the user, and particularly if the cookie
contains personal information.
Cookie Spoofing. Using the same set of servers from the previous example, sup-
pose that info.biz.com and shop.biz.com are administered by different parts
of biz.com. The administrator of info.biz.com creates an application that uses
cookies, and just happens to use the same cookie, Customer, but with a value
having a different meaning (Customer=otherid). Further assume the application
also sets domain=biz.com. Now assume the user visits shop.biz.com and then
info.biz.com or vice versa. The second application visited will be confused by the
cookie that had been set by the first application, because, although each application
uses the same named cookie (Customer), the value for the cookie means different
things. Yet the value of domain causes the cookie to be forwarded in requests to
both servers. While this scenario could be dismissed as poor design or administra-
tion and is probably inadvertent, an attacker attack.biz.com could deliberately
set cookies to disrupt an application the same way: using a value for domain that
causes wider sending of a cookie, and choosing a cookie name that is known to be
disruptive.
Even at the earliest stages of discussion, we identified privacy and caching as
important and difficult issues to resolve. The behavior of the Domain attribute
and how it affected the forwarding of cookies, and, thereby, privacy, was of par-
ticular concern, and the sub-group found it a particularly difficult issue to resolve
satisfactorily.
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A.4.2 Other Issues. We also discussed how to deal with cookies that come from
servers that ran on different port numbers on the same host, and concluded they
could share cookies just like two hosts in the same domain. On the other hand,
we quickly adopted the specification for dealing with caching from my State-Info
proposal.
We discussed the security of the cookie contents (should they be encrypted?),
deciding that, because the cookie value was opaque, a server could, at its discretion,
encrypt the cookie value. We also accepted the idea that users be able to examine
and control cookies, as described in State-Info [Kristol 1995].
A.4.3 Preparing for the March, 1996, IETF Meeting. A late-December confer-
ence call continued a discussion that had emerged on our private mailing list con-
cerning cookies that were, for example, associated with inline requests for images.
We were concerned about how such cookies might be misused to track users. We
had stumbled onto what later became a highly contentious issue, namely “third-
party cookies,” or “unverifiable transactions.” (Section A.4.4) Even at this stage
we recognized that it would be difficult to define just exactly what the term meant.
As part of the teleconference, Lou Montulli agreed that a Netscape technical
writer would create a first I-D for a new specification. However, the draft we
finally received in late January was unsatisfactorily written. Our intended Febru-
ary 1 deadline appeared to be unattainable. By mid-February, and still with no
follow-up from Netscape, I took [NS], folded in elements of my State-Info proposal
and comments that had accumulated on our private mailing list, and produced a
document for discussion by the sub-group.
One part of this draft that got hotly discussed was, surprisingly, caching, which
we thought we had resolved. At issue was what headers a response would have to
contain to successfully instruct both HTTP/1.0 and HTTP/1.1 caching proxies not
to cache a Set-Cookie header along with a response. We deferred to a separate
caching sub-group, which was working on language that could later be incorporated
into the HTTP/1.1 specification.
The draft specification used the same Set-Cookie and Cookie headers that Net-
scape used. We meant for the two mechanisms, the one being defined by us and
the one Netscape was already using, to co-exist. We expected that HTTP/1.1-
compliant clients and servers would follow our new specification. In fact, an un-
derlying assumption of our work was that HTTP/1.1 clients and servers would use
“new” cookies exclusively, and HTTP/1.0 clients and servers would use only “old”
cookies, that is, follow [NS].
In late February, 1996, the sub-group engaged in a hurried cycle of review and
revision of the draft specification, hoping to beat IETF’s cut-off a few days later.
The I-D left a number of questions open, inviting comments from the HTTP com-
munity as well as the state management sub-group. One of the significant contribu-
tions, incorporated nearly verbatim, was Koen Holtman’s wording for “unverifiable
transactions.” Holtman had also provided wording to specify the other servers in
a domain with which a client could share cookies.
A.4.4 Third-Party Cookies. “Unverifiable transactions,” informally “third-party
cookies,” became a target of much vituperation and opposition, so it’s important to
understand what they are and why their treatment in the I-D became controversial.
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Imagine that you tell your browser to visit www.news.com. You wouldn’t find it
particularly surprising when www.news.com sends your browser a cookie in its re-
sponse. If the response from www.news.com included HTML links to images, includ-
ing images for advertisements, your browser would ordinarily load those images au-
tomatically. Suppose those ads came from a third-party site, such as www.ads.com.
Further suppose that in the responses from www.ads.com, your browser received
cookies from www.ads.com. If your browser were configured to alert you when you
received cookies (a feature that was not available at that time), you might have
been perplexed about why, having visited www.news.com, you were receiving cookies
from www.ads.com.
Here is how the February, 1996, I-D described third-party cookies:
4.3.5 Sending Cookies in Unverifiable Transactions A transaction is
verifiable if the user has the option to review the request-URI prior to
its use in the transaction. A transaction is unverifiable if the user does
not have that option. User agents typically use unverifiable transactions
when they automatically get inlined or embedded entities or when they
resolve redirection (3xx) responses. Typically the origin transaction,
the transaction that the user initiates, is verifiable, and that transac-
tion directly or indirectly causes the user agent to make unverifiable
transactions.
Third-party cookies raised a number of concerns, first among them the “surprise
factor.” You receive cookies from sites you were unaware you visited. This concern
was evidenced in news and Usenet articles where people examined the “cookie
file” on their machine and found entries from sites they didn’t recognize. This led
them to fear that their machine’s security had somehow been violated, although
no “break-in” had actually occurred. Even when they understood what happened,
some users felt that a web site had stored information on their machine without
permission.
A second concern was that users had virtually no control over the process. Short
of turning off automatic image loading, a user could not avoid receiving third party
cookies. The transaction between the user’s browser and the third-party site (e.g.,
www.ads.com) was unverified, in the sense that the user had very little means to tell
in advance that their visit to www.news.com would lead to visits to www.ads.com.
The I-D therefore called for browsers to provide a means, however primitive, for
users to be able to predict when third-party transactions might take place, as well as
a way “to determine whether a stateful session is in progress.” It further stipulated
that browsers must not accept cookies from, or send cookies to, third party sites,
although the browser could offer an option that permitted them, provided its default
setting was to disallow them.
When it makes an unverifiable transaction, a user agent must only en-
able the cookie functionality, that is the sending of Cookie request head-
ers and the processing of any Set-Cookie response headers, if a cookie
with a domain attribute D was sent or received in its origin transac-
tion, such that the host name in the Request-URI of the unverifiable
transaction domain-matches D.
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User agents may offer configurable options that allow the user agent,
or any autonomous programs that the user agent executes, to ignore the
above rule, so long as these override options default to “off.”
[emphasis added]
NB: Many current user agents already provide an acceptable review
option that would render many links verifiable.
—When the mouse is over a link, the user agents display the link that
would be followed.
—By letting a user view source, or save and examine source, the user
agents let a user examine the link that would be followed when a
form’s submit button is selected.
—When automatic image loading is disabled, users can review the links
that correspond to images by using one of the above techniques. How-
ever, if automatic image loading is enabled, those links would be un-
verifiable.
Apart from surprise and control, what’s the big deal about third-party cookies,
anyway? The I-D said (with respect to the unverifiable transaction rule above):
The [above] rule eases the implementation of user agent mechanisms
that give the user control over sessions. . . by restricting the number
of cases where control is needed. The rule prevents malicious service
authors from using unverifiable transactions to induce a user agent to
start or continue a session with a server in a different domain. The
starting or continuation of such sessions could be contrary to the privacy
expectations of the user, and could also be a security problem.
In other words, although most users may not initially be aware of it, third-party
cookies raise serious privacy concerns because they facilitate the ability to build
profiles. Suppose that www.ads.com serves ads not just for www.news.com but for a
large number of other content web sites as well. Each time one of these content sites
returns a page to your browser, it may contain links to www.ads.com. Each time it
requests an ad from www.ads.com, your browser returns the ads.com cookie. The
HTTP Referer [sic] header that the browser normally returns with the request
will contain the URL of the page in which the www.ads.com link appeared.27 Thus
ads.com can accumulate a profile of the web sites you (anonymously) have visited.
That is, without specifically knowing who “you” are, it will know what set of web
sites you have visited. Thus ads.com can serve ads that it infers might interest you,
or it can show you a particular ad for a set number of times. Even more worrisome
is the potential for ads.com to share or sell profiles to other companies.
The notion that they are being watched as they browse the Web troubles some
people. It’s a bit like walking into a store and having someone follow you around,
keeping track of what you look at. Moreover, if you return to the store on another
occasion, the tracking resumes. The observer who follows you around might even
make suggestions about things you might want to buy, based on the set of things
you’ve looked at so far. Now suppose you make a purchase using a credit card. All
27 The advertising sites can also have an agreement with the content sites whereby the latter
embed “useful” information in the URLs for the former, obviating the need for Referer.
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of the observations that have been made so far can potentially be linked to “you”:
your name and address, your likely income, based on your ZIP code, what kind of
car you own, what bank accounts you have, and so on.
Whereas there is concern that a single entity, say www.shop.com, may accumulate
a profile about you, particularly once you’ve made a purchase there, you presumably
have some kind of trust relationship with them. On the other hand, you have no
such relationship with the advertising sites that can accumulate a much wider
profile. Moreover, one can argue that their commitment is more likely to be to
the companies who use their service, rather than to the consumers they track, and
the advertising networks are therefore more likely to share profile information with
their customers.
Strangely enough, when we added the words about “unverifiable transactions”
to the I-D, our direct motivation was not advertising networks (which at best we
were only dimly aware of at that time). Instead, Koen Holtman had independently
discovered the theoretical potential to use third-party cookies for profiling, and
he persuaded members of the sub-group that Europeans, at least, would be very
troubled by the potential abuse of privacy they could promote. In fact, in October,
1995, the European Union (EU) issued a directive on the processing of personal
data [EU 1995] that called for informed consent of users before such data could
be collected, which would appear to render unverifiable transactions illegal under
EU law. In any event, many of us expected that if users’ privacy expectations
were violated by third-party cookies, their comfort with this new medium would be
diminished, probably to its detriment.
A.5 Resolving Outstanding Technical Issues
At the March, 1996, IETF meeting, I presented the State Management I-D at the
HTTP Working Group session. The outstanding issues were:
—In the syntax of the Set-Cookie header, were spaces allowed around the ‘=’ signs?
—What is the default for the Path attribute when none is specified? (Do we truly
treat the URL as a prefix, or do we remove the last path element?)
—In the Cookie header, what rules apply for domain-matching to decide which
cookies to return with a request?
—What precise ordering rules apply when multiple cookies can be returned with a
request?
—How can we get “old” and “new” cookies to interoperate?
—How can we deal with older caching proxies?
In subsequent discussions on the sub-group mailing list, we identified three ad-
ditional issues:
—How should we address cookie “spoofing” (described earlier)?
—How should we deal with the fact that existing implementations let the Domain
attribute’s value start with ‘.’?
—Could we change the separator between cookies from ; to ,?
Over the next three weeks, in response to conference calls and sub-group dis-
cussion, I prepared a series of private drafts to address these questions. The most
important results were:
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Interoperation We added a Version attribute to the Set-Cookie header to de-
scribe what version of cookie it is, to distinguish “old” from “new.”.
Cookie Spoofing We added attributes to the Cookie header so an application
could tell whether a given cookie belonged to it. Initially these attributes were
Cookie-Domain, Cookie-Path, and Cookie-Version, but we shortened them
to $Domain, $Path, and $Version. (We were still unsure, however, whether
existing applications would tolerate the $ in the Cookie header. Lou Montulli
guessed $ would have no adverse effect.)
Domain Matching We changed the wording to have the effect of allowing cookie
sharing with at most one level of additional domain name hierarchy.28 Note
that, while this is more restrictive than [NS], we felt that providing a single
level of hierarchy struck a proper balance between functionality and security.
The resulting draft emerged for full review as draft-ietf-http-state-
mgmt-0129 on April 26, 1996. Thereafter, until June 10, there were almost no
comments. I submitted a quick revision, state-mgmt-02 30, because Roy Fielding
noticed that the previous draft contained change marks that would be unacceptable
in an RFC.
A.6 Working Group Last Call: June 10, 1996
Larry Masinter made a working group Last Call to move the I-D to Proposed
Standard, which sparked more discussion on [http-wg], particularly regarding cookie
sharing. Marc Solomon asked whether the specification could be changed so a server
could enumerate a set of servers to which it wanted a cookie returned. The answer
was that such a mechanism makes cookie sharing too easy. That response provoked
an exchange between Koen Holtman and Benjamin Franz. Holtman said it was
important to make it relatively hard to share cookies in ways other than those that
the specification allows. Franz retorted that there are many covert ways to share
cookie information, and that if the specification did not provide legitimate ways
to do so, ways that would be evident to inspection, web sites would employ other
methods that were harder to detect and would thus provide a false sense of security.
However, this discussion ultimately resulted in no change in the I-D.
More editorial changes led to state-mgmt-03, announced on July 16. Changes
from the previous I-D included:
—a new Comment attribute. One concern had long been that there was no way for
a user to know what a cookie was being used for, because the value of a cookie
is “opaque.” The purpose of Comment is to let servers describe (briefly) what a
cookie is for.
—more explicit information about which HTTP headers had to be used with cookies
to produce whatever caching behavior was desired, courtesy of the HTTP caching
sub-group.
28 If Domain=.example.com, the browser may accept cookies from, and send cookies to,
b.example.com but not a.b.example.com.
29 From the web page http://portal.research.bell-labs.com/~dmk/cookie.html you can find
the complete set of publicly available drafts of the cookie specification, often with change bars
between newer and older versions.
30 In the names of further I-Ds, the draft-ietf-http prefix is omitted.
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—clarification that Set-Cookie can accompany any HTTP response, and Cookie
can accompany any HTTP request.
A.7 Becoming an RFC
On July 23, Larry Masinter formally asked the IESG to publish state-mgmt-03
as a Proposed Standard. On August 6, the IESG made its Last Call for the I-D.
A week later, Paul Grand addressed comments to [http-wg] regarding the cookie
specification, identifying two concerns:
(1) the requirement that by default user agents should delete all state information
when they terminate.
(2) the requirement that by default unverifiable transactions be disabled:
In section 4.3.5 eliminating the ability of having “unverifiable”
redirection impairs the ability of the web service (chosen by the
user agent operator) to engage in using the services of a third party
for advertising, content building, download specialized “plugins” or
other usage. This hurts web commerce. Why is this proposed?
I responded that both these requirements adopted the attitude that the user
should get to decide what happens to the state information, and that “informed
consent” should be a guiding principle. Harald Alvestrand, responding on the
IESG’s mailing list31, said:
It seems to me that the draft is heavily emphasizing the right of the
user to be aware of which servers may be tracking his state; I cannot
see that the “third party services” you refer to are significantly hurt by
being unable to track the user’s state in relation to that third party.
In other words, there was support in the IESG for the wording about a browser’s
default behavior regarding state information and a dismissal of the concern that
such a default would impair advertising networks.
A.7.1 IESG Comments, Approval. After that brief exchange, which seemed to
settle the issue, at least so far as the IESG was concerned, there was no further
discussion regarding state management for two months. Finally, on October 15
the IESG made comments that needed to be addressed before the specification
could become a Proposed Standard. The IESG was concerned that the “view
source” feature of browsers might be an inadequate means to check for unverifiable
transactions. I explained that that section of the specification was a compromise
to avoid placing user interface burdens on browser implementors, and I left it to
the Applications Area Director, Keith Moore, to defend that position.
A private discussion among Moore, Masinter, and me considered whether hav-
ing a user examine HTML via “view source” was a minimally acceptable means
of previewing potential unverifiable transactions. After some back and forth, we
31 Alvestrand was, at the time, Applications Area Director, and thus a member of the IESG.
Grand had addressed his comments to the IESG’s mailing list (which is not publicly archived),
and Alvestrand responded to him there. Whether the response was an “official” IESG response
or just an Area Director’s response is unclear.
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crafted some words that expressed the intent of the state management sub-group
while simultaneously satisfying the IESG’s concerns:
Many user agents provide the option for a user to view the HTML
source of a document, or to save the source to an external file where
it can be viewed by another application. While such an option does
provide a crude review mechanism, some users might not consider it
acceptable for this purpose. An example of a more acceptable review
mechanism for a form submit button would be that, when the mouse is
over that button, the user agent displays the action that would be taken
if the user were to select the button.
This formulation attempts to strike a balance between imposing a detailed user
interface requirement on browser vendors and giving them no guidance at all about
what kind of information the browser should provide a user. It says that, ideally, a
browser should provide a user with obvious feedback about where a link will take
the user. However, at a minimum, a sophisticated user would be able to look at
the (HTML) source of a page to decide where the link goes.
Internet Draft state-mgmt-04, which incorporated these changes to satisfy the
IESG’s concerns was announced on November 4.
On November 21, the IESG requested another small change regarding the defini-
tions of “fully-qualified host name” and “fully-qualified domain name.” I submitted
the new changes as state-mgmt-05, which was announced on November 22. The
IESG approved the I-D on December 2, which meant it would be published as a
Proposed Standard RFC.
A.8 A Compatibility Issue Surfaces
Meanwhile, on October 29, Koen Holtman had alerted me to another issue that
would return in greater force later. In an experiment to test interoperation of “old”
and “new” cookies, he found that Microsoft Internet Explorer (MSIE) Version 3
and Netscape Navigator Version 3 behaved differently when they received “new
cookies.” He had a server send the following “new” cookie to an MSIE v3 client:
Set-cookie: xx="1=2\&3-4";
Comment="blah";
Version=1; Max-Age=15552000; Path=/;
Expires=Sun, 27 Apr 1997 01:16:23 GMT
When MSIE sent the cookie back to the server, it looked like this: Cookie:
Max-Age=15552000, whereas Navigator sent Cookie: xx="1=2\&3-4". I also veri-
fied the behavior with MSIE version 2. Clearly two common “old cookie” browsers
behaved differently when they received “new” cookies, a situation that would be
unacceptable long-term.
As luck would have it, I was at the December, 1996, IETF meeting when Holtman
coincidentally reminded me of the problem by email. I described it (as an “MSIE
bug”) to Yaron Goland of Microsoft, and he promised to look into it, and that any
problem found would be addressed in version 4 of MSIE.
A.8.1 Errata for the forthcoming RFC. On December 31, Holtman sent a mes-
sage to [http-wg] to report the above problem, and a second one having to do
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with incorrect information in the I-D concerning headers that affect caching. At
this point I began to assemble a list of errata. A procedural question arose about
whether to wait for the approved I-D to emerge as an RFC first, or to produce
a new Internet Draft that corrected the observed problems and try to replace the
approved I-D in the RFC Editor’s queue. After discussion, Larry Masinter and I
decided to wait until the RFC appeared, which I assumed would not take very long.
At Masinter’s urging, I wrote up the errata to the putative RFC, and on February
4, 1997, the errata I-D (state-mgmt-errata-00.txt) was announced to [http-wg].
It included the aforementioned correction for cache headers, remarks about the
observed MSIE problem, and minor typographical corrections. Discussion on the
HTTP-WG mailing list led to further minor wording changes.
On February 14, Masinter changed his mind in light of the seriousness of the
compatibility issue and urged me to put together a revised I-D of the entire cookie
specification to supersede the one pending in the RFC Editor’s queue. He didn’t
want an I-D with known flaws to become an RFC if we could help it. On February
17, I created such a draft for inspection by the HTTP community before I submitted
it to the Internet Drafts Administrator two days later. Foteos Macrides responded
by describing how several existing cookie implementations failed when servers sent
them “new cookies,” confirming that further revisions were in order. Ironically,
events overtook our plan: RFC 2109 [Kristol and Montulli 1997], HTTP State
Management Mechanism, was announced on February 18.
B. AFTER RFC 2109: FEBRUARY, 1997 TO OCTOBER, 2000
Recall that “RFC” stands for “request for comments.” This RFC certainly pro-
duced comments. First to weigh in was Yaron Goland, who, while commenting
on the new draft I had planned to submit, by extension was commenting on RFC
2109 as well. He contended that the entire mechanism to support “old” and “new”
cookies with the same set of headers depended on how Navigator “handles illegally
formatted cookies.” (Hereafter I’ll refer to v0 cookies to refer to those compatible
with [NS], and I’ll refer to v1 cookies as those that conform to RFC 2109.) He also
(justifiably) criticized the draft’s words that, in identifying an incompatibility with
MSIE, accused MSIE of “send[ing] back the wrong cookie name and value.”
B.1 Fixing the Incompatibility
B.1.1 The Problem. Here’s the technical issue. We want the four possible com-
binations of client and server to interoperate:
—v0 client, v0 server (Cv0Sv0)
—v0 client, v1 server (Cv0Sv1)
—v1 client, v0 server (Cv1Sv0)
—v1 client, v1 server (Cv1Sv1)
Recall the earlier example that led to our first recognizing a problem:
Set-cookie: xx="1=2\&3-4";
Comment="blah";
Version=1; Max-Age=15552000; Path=/;
Expires=Sun, 27 Apr 1997 01:16:23 GMT
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The observed failure was for the Cv0Sv1 combination and depended on how a v0
client interpreted unrecognized attributes. A v0 client would understand Path
and Expires, but not Comment, Version, or Max-Age, which are new to v1. We
incorrectly assumed that all clients would treat the first attribute name-value pair in
a Set-Cookie header as the cookie’s name and value; in fact, that’s what Navigator
did. But [NS] did not specify what the client should do under these circumstances;
MSIE treated the last unrecognized attribute-value pair as the cookie’s name and
value. Given that MSIE had a 20-30% (and growing) share of the browser market
at the time, it was clear that RFC 2109 had to be revised; the compatibility issue
was too serious. Thus the discussions began that aimed at resolving the v0/v1
compatibility problem.
B.1.2 Independent Header Proposal. The most obvious solution was to have two
parallel sets of headers. That is, a server would send both v0 and v1 cookies in
responses. The solution was so obvious, in fact, that the state management sub-
group had already considered and rejected it a year earlier. The problem with
parallel independent headers is that there’s a “chicken-and-egg” deployment prob-
lem. Until the population of clients that understand v1 cookies is sufficiently large,
there’s no incentive for a web site to use them. And since browser vendors would
likely support v0 cookies for some time, web sites could continue to send only v0
cookies without fear of loss of functionality. Even a well-meaning site would have
to send two sets of cookie headers until it concluded “enough” clients understood
v1 cookies, after which it could cease to send v0 cookies. Any site that sent both
headers would incur extra bandwidth expense.
Following some discussion on the sub-group mailing list, I prepared an I-D that
essentially created a new mechanism with two new headers, Set-Cookie2 and
Cookie2, nearly independent of v0 cookies, and I solicited comments. A client
that understood only v0 cookies would ignore the Set-Cookie2 header and would
return v0 cookies as before. Only when a server sent v1 cookies to a v1-capable
client would a client send v1 cookies.32
Because the incompatibility we found opened an opportunity to add other de-
sirable features to the specification, the revised I-D also included a new attribute,
Discard, that had been suggested earlier, and that had been well-received in dis-
cussions. “The Discard attribute instructs the user agent to discard the cookie
unconditionally when the user agent terminates.” Discard overrides Max-Age.
However, my describing a mechanism that was independent of current practice
provoked Larry Masinter to question why exactly we would continue to call them
“cookies,” and why we should be in a hurry to revise RFC 2109 this way if there was
no installed base? In effect we would be adding an entirely new feature to HTTP.
(The IETF emphasizes “rough consensus and running code,” and there was little
running code.) But, the discussion that ensued pointed out that we were trying to
fix an interoperation bug in RFC 2109.
B.1.3 Duplicated Cookie Value Proposal. As a way to make minimal changes to
RFC 2109, Jeff Mogul proposed a clever way to avoid two headers. Using the
previous example, he proposed that servers send the cookie name and value twice,
32 HTTP clients and servers are supposed to ignore headers they do not recognize.
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once at the beginning and once at the end:
Set-cookie: xx="1=2\&3-4";
Comment="blah";
Version=1; Max-Age=15552000; Path=/;
Expires=Sun, 27 Apr 1997 01:16:23 GMT;
xx="1=2\&3-4"
Clients like Navigator, which interpret the first unrecognized attribute-value pair
as the cookie name and value, and those like MSIE, which treat the last such
attribute-value pair as the cookie name and value, would both get the “right an-
swer.” The rule that “If an attribute appears more than once in a cookie, the
behavior is undefined” would be amended to say “unless the value is the same in
each appearance, in which case subsequent appearances are [ignored].”
B.1.4 Additive Proposal. A discussion about the proper resolution of this
dilemma developed on the state management sub-group mailing list. Goland ob-
jected to the two-value solution because of the extra overhead of the duplicated
cookie header: the server would have to send two copies of all the cookie infor-
mation, v0- and v1-style. Instead, he proposed a variant of the duplicate header
solution in my draft. In contrast to my “parallel proposal,” Goland proposed what
we began to call the “additive proposal.” A server would send Set-Cookie as be-
fore. However, if it understood v1 cookies, it would also send a Set-Cookie-V1
header that contained the attribute-value pairs that were new for v1 cookies. Then
the (v1-capable) client would form a complete cookie by combining corresponding
pieces from the Set-Cookie and Set-Cookie-V1 headers. Goland did not propose
a new, matching Cookie-V2 header.
Marc Hedlund noted that the “extra overhead” of Mogul’s two-value solution
depended on the length of the cookie name and value and might not be much
greater than Goland’s additive header proposal, unless the cookie name or value is
long. Goland asserted that, in his experience, cookies tend to be long. Moreover, I
discovered, upon doing a simple experiment, that Mogul’s solution would not work
for MSIE v2, so that possible solution was dropped.
In a separate message to the sub-group, Goland provided comments to my (pri-
vately available) draft and expressed unhappiness with the description of cookie
lifetime (Discard, Max-Age), domain-matching, and requirements on user agents
to allow a user to control and inspect cookies. I explained (because Goland had not
been following those discussions at the time) that the words in RFC 2109 had been
arrived at through hard-won consensus and had been considered of high importance
by the sub-group.
On March 5, I made available to the sub-group a draft that incorporated the ad-
ditive two-header solution to the RFC 2109 compatibility bug. Hedlund said he was
concerned about the complexity of grouping components from two separate headers
to build a single cookie. Goland felt that the new draft satisfied his compatibil-
ity concerns, though he restated his unhappiness about the other issues mentioned
above, and he added that the Secure attribute’s description was “fuzzy.”
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B.2 Other Issues
In addition to the compatibility problem we were already wrestling with, a number
of issues re-surfaced that we thought had been resolved,
(1) unverifiable transactions, out of which grew the idea of “certified cookies”
(2) domain-matching rules, and Port
(3) the Comment attribute
B.2.1 Unverifiable Transactions, Revisited. On March 13, Dwight Merriman of
DoubleClick expressed his opposition to the specified default behavior, saying,
“[d]isabling stateful sessions for unverifiable transactions by default is basically
equivalent to not allowing them at all, because 99% of the population will see no
reason to change the default,” and he went on to describe how the default would
have a negative effect on advertising networks. He did concede “that privacy is
a concern and an important issue.” Goland asserted that the default could hurt
smaller web sites that rely on advertising for support, and that their demise would
reduce the Web’s diversity. Others pointed out that the default setting would by
no means disable advertising networks, but it would affect business models that
depended on third-party cookies.
The ensuing wide-ranging discussion on [http-wg] observed that “cookie sharing”
is possible by other means, and that the “unverifiable transactions” rule does not
prevent it. Dan Jaye stated that, while there might be the potential for privacy
abuse, “the number of web sites and applications that make use of ‘unverifiable
transactions’ for legitimate, non-privacy invading uses is significant and growing.” 33
However, Marc Hedlund said “the concern of the state management subgroup was
crafting a specification that did not create new privacy problems.” And Koen
Holtman added, “The key words in the cookie spec are ‘privacy expectations of the
user’. The spec does not really claim to raise the level of privacy on the web, it
claims to remove some behaviour which is ‘contrary to the privacy expectations of
the user’.”
After 69 messages on the topic in seven days, Larry Masinter called for an end
to the discussion (because it was distracting from work on HTTP/1.1 proper) and
invited those who supported a change in the “unverifiable transaction” default to
write an I-D that outlined their version of the protocol.
A few days later, Dan Jaye posted a proposed revised section on unverifiable
transactions that called for the user agent to “verify that the request-URI comes
from a trusted domain by placing a request to a certificate authority to get the
credentials of the domain.” Although this posting was inadequate because of its
lack of specificity, it did contain the kernel of an idea that Jaye was encouraged to
elaborate. He did so a few days later, although he focussed more on certifying the
identity of the sender of a cookie than the sender’s intended use of the information
collected.
On March 18, I submitted as a new I-D a revision of the draft we had been
discussing, which reflected the additive two-header proposal to solve the incompat-
ibilities we had found, and which added the Discard and Comment attributes. (The
33 Jaye went on to propose a “certified” or “trusted” cookies, about which more later.
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I-D got named state-man-mec-00 because IETF naming rules precluded calling it
state-mgmt-06.)
B.2.2 Domain-matching, again, and Port. In addition to the incompatibility
described above, Goland again raised the domain-matching rules as an issue, and
he questioned why a cookie may be returned only to a server with the same port
number as the server from which the cookie arrived. He also objected to the parts
of the specification that placed requirements on the user interface, claiming it was
out of bounds for the IETF to do so.
The “which port” issue opened a discussion about desirable behavior with respect
to port numbers and cookies. I initially proposed dropping any port restrictions;
a browser could return a cookie to any port on any server that otherwise met the
domain-matching rules. However, that seemed to open a potential security hole,
where cookies sent by a server on one port could leak to other servers on the same
host but running on different ports.
Over the next few days we stumbled into a consensus to add the Port attribute
to solve the perceived problem. Port would behave as follows. If a server sends a
cookie without a Port attribute, a client may return the cookie to a server running
on any port on the same host. If Port is specified without a value, the client may
return the cookie only to the same port from which it was received. If Port has a
value, the value must be a comma-separated list of valid ports to which the cookie
may be returned, and the sending port must be one of them. Thus Port="80,443"
would direct a client to send the cookie to servers on either port 80 or port 443.
B.2.3 Comment, and CommentURL. Among his extensive set of comments, Goland
said that Comment needed to be tagged as to which language it used. (Internation-
alization, or i18n, was and remains a hot topic in the IETF.)
Jonathan Stark proposed yet another new attribute, CommentURL that would re-
semble Comment, except its value would be a URL that a user could inspect to
understand the cookie’s purpose. CommentURL was an attractive idea because it
could direct a user to much more information than Comment could convey. More-
over, the URL could finesse the language issue of Comment by relying on HTTP’s
language negotiation capabilities to provide useful information to a user in her na-
tive language. Finally, the page associated with CommentURL could explain, at the
point where a user must decide whether or not to accept a cookie, what the cookie
is for. Further discussion identified some potential issues:
—What happens if the response to accessing the CommentURL page itself returns a
cookie?
—How, exactly, should CommentURL work? Ideally a user should be able to examine
the CommentURL information before accepting a cookie. Should a browser pop
open a window with the information automatically? (This could cause a loop if
the CommentURL page also included a cookie.)
—Should the content type of the CommentURL page be restricted? Suppose it points
to executable code?
—Should there be a prescribed relationship between the domain of the Request-URI
that gave rise to the cookie and the domain of CommentURL? In other words, may
I get a cookie from www.a.com with a CommentURL="http://www.b.com"?
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We did not resolve these issues until after the next IETF meeting.
B.3 Memphis IETF Meeting: April, 1997
The flurry of activity that led up to the IETF meeting in Memphis in early April,
1997, was followed by a lull. At the meeting I laid out the two areas of contention,
compatibility and default user-agent behavior. I also mentioned that Dan Jaye was
working on a proposal for “certified cookies” that might break the impasse about
unverifiable transactions.
Because the HTTP-WG as a whole was focussed on completing the larger HTTP
specification, the decision was made to move the distracting and contentious state
management discussions to a new, separate mailing list, HTTP-STATE [http-state].
The goal was to try to reach consensus on the new list and then bring the result
back to HTTP-WG. (Procedurally, [http-wg] remained the mailing list of record
for reaching working group consensus on HTTP state management.)
B.3.1 Certified Cookies. Jaye’s “certified cookie” idea had evolved and looked
like it might resolve the “unverifiable transaction” default setting issue. The idea
was to create a mechanism whereby the user can configure her browser to accept
cookies, even third-party cookies, from senders that have been pre-authorized. The
cookie senders would obtain a cryptographic certificate that attests to the sender’s
identity and that asserts how they would use the information collected via cookies.
They would send the certificate along with the cookie. The browser could then
verify the certificate’s authenticity and check whether the uses the sender would
make of the cookie information would fall within the bounds the user has configured.
If so, the cookie would be accepted without further notification to the user. If not,
either the cookie could be rejected outright, or the user could be asked whether
to accept the cookie. Separate (private) agencies would audit the behavior of the
organizations that obtain cookie certificates to verify that the information collected
via cookies was indeed being used as the senders claimed.
Certified cookies promised some nice properties.
—Users could fine-tune what cookies they’re willing to accept, based on how the
information collected would be used.
—Web sites that send cookies could allay users’ fears about how information would
be used by the way they labeled cookies and by their willingness to have that use
audited.
On May 15, Dan Jaye’s first I-D, jaye-trust-state-00, was announced. The
mechanism proposed there for “certified cookies” was an extension to RFC 2109+34.
I encouraged Jaye to design it as an add-on to the cookie specification, rather than
to try to merge the two. In late May, there was some discussion on [http-state]35
about whether this was the correct approach, or whether merging the two would be
better. The consensus was that RFC 2109+ without Jaye’s extensions was necessary
as a base for those situations where no certified cookie was present. Moreover, it
34 I’ll use the notation “RFC 2109+” to refer to the RFC that we were working on to supersede
RFC 2109.
35 “Advertisers win one in debate over ‘cookies’ ”
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seemed likely that agreement could be reached on it sooner than on Jaye’s wholly
new proposal.
B.3.2 Trying to Achieve New Consensus: May-July, 1997. In early May, 1997,
I submitted state-man-mec-01, which included the new Port attribute, but not
CommentURL, because there was no consensus for it. Despite the discussions concern-
ing them, the language regarding ”unverifiable transactions” remained unchanged.
This new draft sparked virtually no discussion (because of “cookie fatigue”?). How-
ever, a stray thought led me to reexamine the wording for “unverifiable transac-
tions,” and to start a private discussion with Koen Holtman about remedies.
It turned out that the wording in RFC 2109 was even more restrictive regarding
“unverifiable transactions” than we intended or that even the fiercest opponents
of the RFC had accused us of. The wording quoted in Section A.4.4 regarding
the default setting implies that a session cannot be initiated via an unverifiable
transaction (in addition to all the other restrictions) unless the “origin transaction”
resulted in a cookie’s being returned to the client. In other words, if the client
did not receive a cookie with the origin response, it could never accept cookies
for responses for, for example, embedded images. We massaged the words (and
introduced the concepts of reach and third-party host) to remove the above error
without changing our otherwise intended behavior with respect to “unverifiable
transactions.” In mid-June, state-man-mec-02 was issued to correct the error.
And then there was silence on [http-state]. Inasmuch as silence could be construed
as indifference, acceptance, or lack of awareness, I asked Larry Masinter to issue a
Working Group Last Call, hoping we could pass the I-D to the IESG, and he did
so on July 8. The Last Call once again brought forth comments, and the volume
eventually led Larry Masinter to withdraw the Last Call. The comments focussed
on three ever-popular issues: the domain matching rules, CommentURL, and the rules
for combining Set-Cookie and Set-Cookie2.
There was also some discussion about whether it made sense to continue discus-
sion of RFC 2109+ at all. There were suggestions to take RFC 2109 off the IETF
standards track and mark it either “Experimental” or “Historical.” However, do-
ing nothing was unacceptable, because of the acknowledged technical flaws in RFC
2109. There was also a request to “document how cookies are implemented today.”
Indeed such a document would be useful, but it would be completely separate from
RFC 2109+. I was not willing to write it, however, and I thought it could be
written most effectively by the browser vendors, but no one volunteered to do so.
B.3.3 Domain-Matching. Dave Morris noted some deficiencies in the domain-
matching wording that would adversely affect intranets. We crafted some words
that would allow cookies to work as intended even if a domain name was not fully
qualified.
B.3.4 CommentURL. Dave Morris objected to the fact that, despite a high degree
of support for its addition, CommentURL was absent from state-man-mec-02. At
one point during the ensuing discussion, he said, “It would be irresponsible pro-
tocol design to not provide the more complete approach [than Comment] in the
protocol.” I agreed that there was support for it, but that we had not worked
out words that described how a user agent should deal with receiving or send-
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ing cookies while inspecting the CommentURL. The resulting discussion (“Removing
CommentURL” [http-wg]) produced further vigorous support for the addition of
CommentURL, as well as these words to address cookies within CommentURL:
The cookie inspection user interface may include a facility whereby a
user can decide, at the time the user agent receives the Set-Cookie2
response header, whether or not to accept the cookie. A potentially
confusing situation could arise if the following sequence occurs:
—the user agent receives a cookie that contains a CommentURL attribute;
—the user agent’s cookie inspection interface is configured so that it
presents a dialog to the user before the user agent accepts the cookie;
—the dialog allows the user to follow the CommentURL link when the user
agent receives the cookie; and,
—when the user follows the CommentURL link, the origin server (or an-
other server, via other links in the returned content) returns another
cookie.
The user agent should not send any cookies in this context. The user
agent may discard any cookie it receives in this context that the user
has not, through some user agent mechanism, deemed acceptable.
B.3.5 Additive vs. Independent Headers. Dave Morris once again raised objec-
tions to the additive solution to the compatibility problem in RFC 2109, and Foteos
Macrides joined him. Macrides had actually implemented both RFC 2109 and the
subsequent I-Ds in the Lynx text-only browser, and he felt the additive solution
was highly error-prone, both on the client side (matching the components of the
respective headers) and in applications (sending the corresponding pieces correctly).
Recall that the impetus for the additive approach was to avoid sending the cookie
value twice. Two events prompted us to consider dropping the additive approach
and returning to the originally proposed and arguably simpler-to-implement inde-
pendent header approach:
(1) Dave Morris described how a server would only need to send both Set-Cookie
and Set-Cookie2 headers the first time it receives a request from a client. On
subsequent requests, a client will send a Cookie header, and its content will
reveal whether the client understands v0 or v1 cookies. The server can then
send one response header, either Set-Cookie or Set-Cookie2.
(2) Since Yaron Goland was the lone voice arguing for the additive approach, and
assertions were made to [http-wg] that neither Microsoft nor Netscape would
implement RFC 2109+, there no longer seemed to be a reason to pursue the
unpopular and fragile additive approach.
It might seem strange to continue a standards effort for a feature that two major
vendors say they will not support. While that is certainly an undesirable circum-
stance, it does not necessarily derail the process. An IETF standard may represent
what is considered the best technical approach, even if vendors disagree. Major
vendors’ voices do not trump “rough consensus.” Moreover, the requirement for at
least two interoperative implementations to exist before a Proposed Standard can
advance in the process does not require that they come from major vendors. The
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issue is whether the standard can be implemented consistently, not whether it is
popular.
At the end of July, 1997, we were again bumping up against an I-D submission
deadline before a meeting in Munich. On July 29 I recommended dropping the
additive approach in favor of the independent header approach.
The goal of RFC 2109+ was to advance cookie technology from [NS] to something
better-defined, more standard, and with better privacy safeguards for users. But a
technical issue could impede the transition to this technology, namely, how could a
server discover that a user’s browser supported the newer technology? As described
above, a server could successfully learn that a browser understood v1 cookies if
it responded to a request that contained no Cookie header: It would send both
Set-Cookie and Set-Cookie2 headers. The browser’s next request would reveal
which of those it understood. But suppose the user upgraded her browser to one
that understood v1 cookies, but it retained an old cookie repository. The cookies
sent in new requests would still be v0 cookies, and the server would not realize that
the browser could handle v1 cookies.
We quickly converged on a solution. A browser sends Cookie2: $Version=1
when it sends v0 cookies but it understands v1 cookies.
The Cookie2 header advises the server that the user agent understands
new-style cookies. If the server understands new-style cookies, as well, it
should continue the stateful session by sending a Set-Cookie2 response
header, rather than Set-Cookie. A server that does not understand new-
style cookies will simply ignore the Cookie2 request header.
On July 29 I announced an unofficial (not submitted) I-D for inspection by the
working group that contained the wording that returned to the “independent head-
ers” approach, along with minor wording improvements regarding domain and host
names. My goal was to submit an acceptable I-D by the pre-meeting cutoff the
next day. Indeed, after some minor comments (to add Cookie2), I did submit a
new I-D, which was announced August 5, as state-man-mec-03.
B.4 Munich IETF Meeting: August, 1997, and After
I did not attend the Munich meeting, although both cookies and “certified cookies”
were on the agenda. However, Judson Valeski reported that the consensus (actually,
straw poll) of people attending was to remove Comment and CommentURL from the
specification. However, Larry Masinter pointed out that “most of the concerned
parties weren’t there” [http-wg]. He went on to say
It is my WG-chair opinion that progress on the protocol itself has
been held hostage to the current language in the protocol description
dealing with the privacy issue, and that one way to make progress might
be to split the document but not the specification. (This would allow
the privacy considerations section to be revised even if the protocol
specification was not.)
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B.5 Splitting the Specification
No further public discussion of cookies occurred for two months. On October 10,
1997, I posted a message to [http-wg]36 to invite discussion on the proposal to split
the specification into two parts. One part would describe the purely technical “wire
protocol.” The second would address the privacy and “unverifiable transaction”
pieces of the specification.
To quote one of the Appl. Area Directors: “The point of serializing
these efforts is to focus the working group’s discussion.”
After some private discussions with Keith Moore and Larry Masinter about
whether this approach would yield any progress, I agreed to split the documents.
The plan was to reach consensus on the first part before visiting the second, and the
first part would then be closed to discussion. The resulting wire-protocol-only draft,
state-man-mec-04, was announced on October 25 and carried a note explaining
that the privacy provisions had been temporarily removed.
Over two weeks elapsed with no discussion of state-man-mec-04 whatsoever.
Accordingly, Larry Masinter issued a working group Last Call on November 11.
A few issues were raised on [http-wg] of an essentially editorial nature, and the
comments were folded into another I-D, state-man-mec-05, which anticipated yet
another IETF meeting in early December.
B.6 Washington IETF Meeting: December, 1997, and after
The HTTP Working Group sessions at the IETF meeting were mostly concerned
with finalizing the HTTP specification, as this was likely to be the final meeting of
the WG. I gave a brief presentation on the current state of the cookie specification.
Later, a small group of interested people met informally to discuss the specification.
We agreed there was one technical issue remaining, and one political issue. The
political issue was the ever-popular “unverifiable transactions.”
The technical issue was the domain-matching rule, with two sub-problems:
(1) how to restrict the set of servers to which a cookie can be returned; and
(2) how to support “flat namespaces.” For example, if an intranet had two hosts,
foo and bar, and if there were no associated domain with those names, then
foo and bar would be unable to share cookies.
On December 15, I posted a message to [http-wg] 37 to summarize where I thought
things stood. The first order of business was to resolve the intranet cookie sharing
issue. On December 31 I started a thread in [http-state] 38 to discuss it. We
considered Internet Explorer’s “Zones” feature as a model for how to share cookies
in an intranet, but we couldn’t agree on how to describe Zones in a technology-
neutral way, and Zones seemed to be addressing a much bigger issue anyway. On
January 2, Scott Lawrence mentioned that another working group was considering
the .local domain as the implicit domain for intranets. We quickly converged on
the idea of using Domain=.local to allow a server to share cookies with all other
36 “making progress on cookies”
37 “the state of State”
38 “Step 1: domain matching rules”
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servers in an intranet. However, this solution did not provide a means to restrict a
cookie to some, but not all such servers.
Solving the broader domain-matching rules proved difficult (as it had before).
On January 6, I summarized the dilemma [http-state]:
So the challenge is to specify domain-matching rules that strike a proper
balance between simplicity and functionality (where functionality in-
cludes allowing desirable outcomes and avoiding undesirable ones, such
as excessive cookie sharing). The rules must work correctly for .local
domain names.
On the one hand, it’s easy to justify that all servers belonging to one company
in the domain example.com should be able to share cookies if they so desire. In
particular, these servers might all wish to share cookies:
example.com
product.example.com
v0.product.example.com
v1.product.example.com
On the other hand, imagine that a company mall.com hosts a “shopping mall,” so
there are domain names shop1.mall.com, shop2.mall.com, etc. Here it’s obviously
undesirable for the individual shops to be able to see each other’s cookies.
The underlying problem is that we’re trying to infer the bounds of administra-
tive control based on domain names, and that approach is inherently flawed. The
domain name system has no externally imposed consistent structure. Even [NS]’s
two-dot/three-dot rule is fragile (and with the addition in 2000 of more top-level
domains, it would need to be extended).
Ultimately we agreed we could not resolve the intranet problem beyond allowing
a choice between “share with all” or “share with none.”
B.7 Working Group Last Call: March, 1998
state-man-mec-06 drew no discussion. Accordingly, on February 4, 1998, I at-
tempted to close off discussion of the protocol-only portion of the I-D. There were
a few further minor editorial comments that led to state-man-mec-07, which ap-
peared on February 11. Having completed the first part of the separate-drafts
strategy, I restored the privacy provisions to the specification, which became avail-
able on February 18 as state-man-mec-08. Subsequent discussion was to focus
solely on the privacy issues.
To my surprise, there were no further comments on the cookie specification,
despite the fact that I deliberately “trolled” for some. Therefore I asked Larry
Masinter to make a working group Last Call for state-man-mec-08 to move forward
on the standards track. He asked to delay that step for a few days so he could
simultaneously issue a Last Call for two other working group items, one of which
was the HTTP/1.1 specification, and for all to advance to Draft Standard instead.
That Last Call was issued on March 13, 1998.
Advancing the cookie specification to Draft Standard would require evidence of
at least two independently written interoperating implementations. Accordingly I
made private inquiries about people’s implementations. I learned that there were
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a few RFC 2109 client implementations and one (nearly two) state-man-mec-08
client implementations. However, no one volunteered that they had a server im-
plementation for either specification. It therefore seemed appropriate procedurally
to deem it a new Proposed Standard. The IESG issued an IETF Last Call to that
effect.
B.8 Limbo: April, 1998 to April, 2000
The cookie specification then entered a nearly two-year limbo state. Except for
minor editorial changes, which led to new drafts (through state-man-mec-12),
little of substance happened. The mailing lists ([http-state] and [http-wg]) carried
virtually no discussion. IANA requested a References section. IESG requested
that the typography for may/must/. . . language use the more traditional IETF
MAY/MUST/. . . .
In June, 1998, I learned that the IESG was holding up the progress of the specifi-
cation to Proposed Standard. In the year and a half since RFC 2109 had appeared,
the IESG’s makeup had changed, and a newer member expressed unhappiness that
Comment and CommentURL were not mandatory, given the specification’s claimed
devotion to privacy. Ironically, the new IESG felt so strongly about the privacy
issues that, even though the wording in state-man-mec-08 was at least as strict as
in RFC 2109, they felt the need for someone to write an “applicability statement,”
because the working group and the IESG could not agree on wording regarding
privacy. It would have words to the effect that the cookie specification is approved
as a Proposed Standard subject to the condition that implementations also follow
the applicability statement.
Keith Moore, Applications Area Director, finally wrote a draft applicability state-
ment, draft-iesg-http-cookies-00.txt, in November. Despite the appearance
of the applicability statement, the IESG did not act upon state-man-mec-10
through three IETF meetings and well past the draft’s January, 1999, nominal
expiration. Finally, on June 23, 1999, the IESG issued simultaneous IETF Last
Calls for the cookie specification and applicability statement. Once again there
was some perception, because of the long delay, that these documents had sprung
from nowhere.
The resulting discussion on [http-wg] included some minor technical comments
and some broad assertions. Among the latter was an extended statement that there
was insufficient consensus on the specification, that it was too controversial, and
that it should either be allowed to die silently or should be deemed Experimental.
Larry Masinter, as Working Group chair, held that process had been followed,
although he agreed that the consensus was, indeed, “rough.”
Over the next few weeks, a discussion developed on [http-state] about the techni-
cal issues, culminating, on August 17, in a new I-D, state-man-mec-11. In response
to worthwhile requests for clarifications from an implementor, I made further re-
visions to the specifications, and these appeared in state-man-mec-12 on August
31. Meanwhile, there had been comments on the applicability statement as well,
and it needed to be revised.
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B.9 Finale: April, 2000 to October, 2000
I began to “ping” the Area Directors periodically about whether anything was
happening. Finally the IESG issued a Last Call for both state-man-mec-12 and
the applicability statement on April 28, 2000. Their having received no further
comments, the IESG approved their advancement on August 7, 2000. RFC 2965,
HTTP State Management Mechanism [Kristol and Montulli 2000], was announced
on October 7. RFC 2964, BCP (Best Current Practice) 44, Use of HTTP State
Management, was announced on October 12 [Moore and Freed 2000].
